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ABSTRACT
EXPLORATIONS IN SUPPLY AND DEMAND FUNCTION
EQUILIBRIA
Harun Bulut
Department of Economics 
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray 
March 1999
In this study, we regard the oligopolistic-oligopsonistic markets within the 
framework of a “double auction” in which both buyers and sellers make 
bids. To this end, we introduce games where declarations of supply and de­
mand functions (which need not be true) are treated as strategic variables of 
producers and consumers, respectively, rather than just as “binding commit­
ments” on the part of these parties. Whether firms produce with positive or 
zero marginal cost, the number of agents on each side of the market, whether 
consumers act as a union or not and time structure of the moves lead to 
different games. Existence of symmetric equilibria of each of these games is 
established. Most of them are shown to be unique. The equilibrium out­
comes of these games are compared with the naked Cournot outcome as well 
as among themselves regarding the market price, total quantity produced, 
individual consumer’s surplus, individual firm’s profit and social welfare they 
lead to. To allow the consumers to behave strategically along with the pro­
ducers, naturally makes the former better off and the latter wor.se off, while 
the net effect of this on total social welfare turns out to be case-contingent.
Keywords: Demand Function Equlibria, Supply Function Equilibria, Double 
Auction, Oligopoly, Oligopsony
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ÖZET
ARZ VE TALEP FONKSİYONU DENGELERİNE İLİŞKİN
İNCELEMELER
Harun Bulut 
iktisat Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Semih Koray 
Mart 1999
Bu galı.'jrnada oligopolistik-oligopsonistik piyasaları, hem alıcıların hem de 
satıcıların teklif verdiği “çift ihale” çerçevesinde düşünüyoruz. Bu yüzden 
(gerçek olması gerekmeyen) talep ve arz fonksiyonu bildirimlerinin sırasıyla 
tüketiciler ve üreticiler açından “bağlayıcı taahhütler” olmaktan çok stratejik 
değişkenler olarak alındığı bazı oyunlar tanımlıyoruz. Firmaların rnarginal 
maliyetlerinin pozitif veya sıfır olması, piyasanın her iki tarafındaki aktör 
sayısı, tüketicilerin birlik olarak hareket edip etmemeleri ve hamlelerin za­
manlama yapısı değişik oyunlara yol açmaktadır. Bütün bu oyunların simetrik 
dengelerinin varlığı ve pek çoğunun da tekliği gösterilmiştir. Ayrıca bu oyun­
ların denge sonuçları, hem kendi aralarında hem de çıplak Cournot denge 
sonucuyla, yol açtıkları piyasa fiyatı, toplam üretilen miktar, kişisel tüketici 
artığı, firma başına kar ve toplam sosyal refah temel alınarak karşılaştırılmıştır. 
Firmaların yanı sıra tüketicilerin de stratejik davranmalarına izin vermek, 
doğal olarak tüketicileri daha iyi bir duruma getirirken firmaların getirilerini 
azaltmaktadır. 0 te yandan bunun toplam sosyal refaha olan etkisi duruma 
bağlı olarak değişmektedir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Talep Fonksiyonu Dengeleri, Arz Fonksiyonu Dengeleri, 
Çift İhale, Oligopol, Oligopson
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As is well known, in perfectly competitive markets theory consumers and 
firms are assumed to occur in large numbers. Competitive firms can not affect 
the market price, nor can the consumers. Market price is determined by the 
intersection of aggregate demand and aggregate supply. No strategic role is 
attributed to either consumers or firms, for the impacts of individual agents’ 
actions upon supply and demand are so negligible that they go unnoticed 
by the market. On the other hand, oligopolistic market theory deals with 
market interactions of a small number of firms. The literature on the game 
theoretic analysis of oligopolistic markets mostly attributes a strategic role to 
firms but not to consumers and justifies this by the asymmetry in the sizes of 
both parties. Since consumers are assumed to occur in large numbers, each 
individual consumer remains negligible, and so, their existence can only be 
traced in the market demand which is regarded as a binding commitment on 
the part of the whole consumer body, whereas firms, given market demand, 
enter to competition among each other by utilizing strategic variables which 
vary from quantity, price, supply function to mark-up over average cost.
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However, we also observe that there are markets in which a small number 
of consumers interact. In fact there are even cases where a monopsonist 
prevails on the demand side or where consumers are not uniform, but highly 
differentiated regarding the size of their demands. The soccer transfer market 
provides a typical example of such markets. In transfer sessions a small 
number of players and clubs negotiate over contracts. Another example is 
auctions on government bonds in which a certain number of large banks are 
allowed to participate. In weapons industry, the government stands as a 
monopsonist and a small number of firms are awarded contracts. Whenever 
big firms are demanding a particular good as an intermediate good beyond 
individuals’ consumption demand, they have the power to affect the market 
price. Energy sector is a typical example of this. Thus, in markets similar to 
the above it is natural to ascribe a strategic role to the demand side as well. 
Furthermore, such a consideration allows to analyze the welfare effects of a 
possible organized behavior on the part of consumers. To this end, here we 
model games where consumers act as active players by declearing demand 
functions (which need not not be true, but become a binding commitment 
once decleared) as strategies along with firms whose strategies are supply 
functions. The roots of an approach which ascribes to also the consumers a 
stategic role by allowing them to manipulate demand functions can be traced 
back in the literature as well and will be discussed in our survey below.
At the initial development of game theoretic analysis of oligopolistic mar­
kets Cournot-Nash solution has been mostly used, where firms’ strategy is 
quantity. Bertrand solution also obtained remarkable attention where firms 
compete with prices. Later Grant and Quiggin^ study a game where firms’
^Grant, S. and J. Quiggin., “Nash Equilibrium with Mark-Up Pricing Oligopolists.”,
strategic variable is the mark-up over average cost. Grossman^ by introduc­
ing supply schedules as firms’ strategic variable obtains competitive equilibria 
as a Nash equilibria outcomes of supply functions under some restrictions on 
supply functions. Therefore, he proves that in a uniform industry with large 
fixed costs competitive equilibrium outcome can be obtained even if there 
are few numbers of firms. When competitive equilibrium does not exist due 
to the integer problem^, he defines approximate competitive equilibrium and 
gives supply function strategies yielding this equilibrium. Note that since 
fixed quantity and fixed price are special cases of supply functions, Cournot 
competition and Bertrand competition are special cases of supply function 
competition. Think of a firm commits itself Cournot-Nash equilibrium quan­
tity, i.e. vertical supply function at that quantity, any supply function leading 
to Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and quantity outcome, including the ver­
tical supply function at the respective quantity is optimal for the other firm. 
Thus, Cournot-Nash equilibrium is obtained by a Nash equilibrium in supply 
functions. Similarly, monopoly outcome and Grant-Quiggin mark-up equi­
librium outcome can be the Nash equilibrium outcome of supply functions. 
Though he gives an example in which supply function equilibrium exists but 
Bertrand equilibrium, both solution concepts are similar in the way that a 
firm can eliminate its rivals. The multiplicity of equilibrium is one of the
Economic Letters. 45 (1994), 245-251.
■^Grossman, S. J., “Nash Equilibrium and the Industrial Organization of Markets with
Large Fixed Costs.” Econometrica. 49 (1981), 1149-1172.
I^n Grossman, “Nash”., competitive equilibrium defined as follows: it is a list of a
price, a quantity and an integer, (T‘’,q‘^ ,nc) such that AD{P’^ ) =  Uc?“’, MC{q^) = P ‘^ ,
AC{q' )^ = MC{q^)· There will not always be an integer satisfying AD{M C‘^ ) = ricq'^ .
Then integer problem arises.
criticisms raised to Grossman'*. In his characterization of supply function 
equilibria, he introduces further restrictions on supply schedules and uses 
supply correspondences and then every Nash equilibrium in supply functions 
turns out to be competitive equilibrium. These restrictions are also subject 
to criticisms. Especially, in an environment where there is no regulation the 
restrictions to firms on picking supply schedules seem unnatural. Having 
the same concerns Koray and Sertel^ and Klemperer and Meyer® are two re- 
spones with different motivations. The former looks at the problem from the 
point of view of regulation. Their work is an generalization and extension 
of Loeb and Magat^. In Loeb and Magat’s problem given a known indus­
try demand, firms which have private information on their cost structures 
compete by bidding for a monopoly position. The critical condition is that 
there must be enough number of contenders. The highest bid comes from the 
most efficient firm who offers perfectly discriminating monopoly profit. After 
entry, the winner operates as marginal cost pricer so that it could harvest 
franchise fee back. At the end it obtains zero profit and consumers surplus 
is maximized. Moreover, social welfare, the sum of profits and consumers’ 
surplus, is maximized. Note that when there is only one firm, natural mo­
nopolist, their procedure does not work. The outcome is standard monopoly
■^Grossman, “Nash”.
^Koray, S. and M. R. Sertel., “Socially Optimal FVanchise Bidding for an Oligopoly.” 
Unpublished. Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey and Boğaziçi University, Istanbul, 
Turkey, 1989.
®Klemperer, P. D. and M. A. Meyer., “Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly Under
Uncertainty.”, Econometrica. 57 (1989), 1243-1277.
■^ Loeb, M. and W. A. Magat., “A Decentralized Method for Utility Regulation.”, Jour­
nal of Law and Economics. 22:2 (October 1979), 399-404.
outcome. However, it is our observation that when consumers are considered 
as players in that situation they become better off. For an oligopoly, Koray 
and Sertel® similarly offer a franchise bidding mechanism. In this mechanism, 
each firm is invited to make a bid including the amount they will produce 
and a function for monetary compensation the firm asks. Then consumers 
union to maximize consumers’ total welfare picks a group of firms. After 
defining social welfare as the sum of consumers surplus and profits, under 
some fairly general conditions on industry demand function and cost func­
tion of each firm and under a condition on number of firms providing the 
competitive behavior, Koray and Sertel show that there is a Nash equilib­
rium in bids which maximizes social welfare. When industry is uniform, it 
turns out that every Nash equilibrium in bids leads to the social optimum. 
Thus, their results give Grossman’s supply function equilibrium theorem*  ^
as corollary. In Koray and Sertel’s model consumers are not considered as 
players. Whether to attribute consumers a strategic role would lead to social 
optimum remains as open question. Our model is an attempt in this direc­
tion. Klemperer and Meyer^° is the other response to Grossman“ . Although 
they neglect fixed costs, they criticize Grossman by demonstrating too many 
equilibria in supply functions. They solve this problem by introducing un­
certainty in industry demand. The justification of firm’s commitment to 
supply functions turns out to be better adaptation to the uncertainty. When 
industry demand is subject to exogenous random shock, firms set price for 
each realization of random shock and so they achieve ex-post optimal adjust-
®Koray and Sertel, “Franchise” 
®Grossman, “Nash”.
Klemperer and Meyer, “Supply ” 
Grossman, “Nash”
ment to the shock. This adjustment reduces the set of equilibria in supply 
functions even to a unique equilibrium under appropriate assumptions. The 
Klemperer and Meyer’s solution concept has been applied to strategic trade 
policy^^ and in the analysis of electricity spot market^  ^ with some minor 
modifications depending on the problem at hand. Green^ "* again uses supply 
function model to analyze increasing competition in British electricity mar­
ket but takes industry demand as a function of time rather than exogenous 
random shock. Klemperer and Meyer’s solution concept also used in Grant 
and Quiggin^^. In their theoretical work they consider two stage game. In 
the first stage firms make capital commitment and in the second stage firms 
enter supply function competition. Depending on the technology specifica­
tion, they show that solution will go from Bertrand to Cournot. For the 
special case of constant-elasticity demand solution will be equal to mark-up 
equilibrium solution. Another recent work related to Klemperer and Meyer^ ® 
is Khiin^ .^ He analyzes a vertically separated duopolistic market in which 
manufacturers’ strategy variable is wholesale price, whereas retailers com-
^^See Laussel, D., “Strategic Commercial Policy Revisited: A Supply Function Equilib­
rium Model.”, The American Economic Review. 82:1 (March 1992), 84-99.
^^See Bolle, F., “Supply Function Equilibria and the Danger of Tacit Collusion. The
Case of Spot Markets for Electricity.” Energy Economics. (1992), 94-102. and Green, R. 
J. and D. M. Newbery., “Competition in the British Electricity Spot Market.”, Journal of 
Political Economy. 100: 5 (1992), 929-953.
‘^ Green, R. J., “Increasing Competition in the British Electricity Market.” The Journal
of Industrial Economics. XLIV: 2 (June 1996), 205-216.
‘^Grant, S. and J. Quiggin., “Capital Precommitment and Competition in Supply Sched­
ules.”, The Journal of Industrial Economics. XLIV: 4 (December 1996), 427- 441. 
Klemperer and Meyer, “Supply”
'^Kiihn, K., “Nonlinear Pricing in Vertically Related Duopolies.” RAND Journal of 
Economics. 28:1 (Spring 1997), 37-62.
pete with quantity. If uncertainty in market demand is additive his model 
coincides with a model of competition in inverse supply functions. However, 
under more general forms of shocks to the demand he shows that both mod­
els’ equilibrium allocations differ. Finally, Bolle^® is an interesting work in 
lines with Klemperer and M e y e r I t  is an extension of Bolle^°. Important 
distinguishing feature of his model from the models we cited so far is that 
some group of buyers are players and their strategies are demand functions. 
Thus, he deviates from the assumption of large number of uniform buyers. 
He gives examples of electricity markets such as Norway and New Zealand 
where demand-side bids are also allowed. He models electricity market in 
which there are suppliers, big-users and small consumers. Suppliers and big- 
users behave strategically with their strategies supply function and demand 
functions respectively and small consumers have an affine autonomous de­
mand function which is subject to additive random shock. Once the supply 
functions and demand functions are chosen an auctioneer equates excess sup­
ply to autonomous demand and obtains equilibrium price as a function of 
random shock. He defines Bayes-Nash equilibria of the game in which each 
supplier and big-user maximizes his expected payoff. Then he finds neces­
sary and sufficient conditions for best responses for both demand and supply 
functions. This leads to system of differential equations and for solving them 
he suggests power series solution. We define a similar game in the section 
Nash Game, yet there are important differences. Though Bolle^  ^ argues that
*®Bolle, F., “Competition in Supply and Demand Functions.” Unpublished. Europa-
Universitt Viadrina, Frankfurt, Germany, September 1997.
^^Klemperer and Meyer, “Supply”
^°Bolle, “Electricity”
21 Bolle, “Demand”
deterministic autonomous demand does not make much sense, we do not con­
sider an autonomous demand so in the Bolle’s language autonomous demand 
is zero. In our model all consumers are players and compete with each other 
and against firms with demand functions. In addition, Bolle assumes a fixed 
profit rate at each unit of electricity for big users and if equilibrium price is 
higher than the constant profit rate big users do not demand at all at that 
price. This assumption can be justified in the context of electricity market, 
however we consider a more general context in which each consumer has an 
affine demand function and by “misrepresenting” his demand function he 
tries to maximize his consumer surplus. With such a set-up we arrive sig­
nificant results and indicate that deterministic demands matter. We study 
the both cases where firms are producing with positive marginal cost and 
with zero marginal cost and observe that zero marginal cost assumption in 
Bolle'^ '^  is not satisfactory. Furthermore, we analyzed the case where con­
sumers union play on behalf of consumers with aggregate demand against 
firms both in a Nash game and a Stackelberg game. We investigate how an 
organized behavior on the side of consumers effect welfare distribution. We 
answer this question in this context.
Hurwicz^  ^ is an early reference introducing the idea that consumers can 
misrepresent their preferences. In an exchange economy with all goods are 
private if consumers are in finite numbers, he shows that when all other con­
sumers stick to their true preferences and behave as price taker, it can be in
^^Bolle, “Demand”
^^Hurwicz, L., “Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation Pro­
cesses.” In Studies in Resource Allocation Processes, eds. L. Hurwicz and K. J. Arrow, 
443-457. 1977.
his best interest of the remaining consumer to misrepresent his preferences. 
Therefore, he concludes that perfect competition may not be individually 
incentive compatible. Finiteness of consumers is crucial for his conclusion. 
When consumers are infinitely many, he heuristically argues that perfectly 
competitive behavior is incentive compatible that is telling the truth is the 
best response for every consumer when others do so. Firstly, we study the in­
centive compatibility problem for consumers and firms in an economy where 
consumption and production take place and having oligopolistic and oligop- 
sonistic features. In the section Nash Game we present a formal proof of 
the result that when number of consumers goes to the infinity in the limit 
consumers are telling the truth about their respective private information in 
a Nash game.
Another early reference in which demand functions are used as strategies 
is Wilson '^* on share auctions. In Wilson’s model finite numb(u of symmetric 
bidders compete for shares of a single object. They give demand schedules 
as a function of the price per share. The seller picks the price such that sum 
of the shares equals to 1 . Wilson comes up with the result that buyers are 
substantially better off in a share auction compared to the unit auction where 
each bidder names a price for entire object. Note that seller behaves here as 
if Stackelberg leader and offering 1 unit object for sale is nothing but making 
a vertical supply function commitment. Thinking of 1 unit of object as an 
autonomous supply fits better to Wilson’s formulation. Though there is no 
cost of producing the object in Wilson’s model, one can attribute a positive 
cost to the seller. Since object is already produced before demand schedules
■^’Wilson, R., “Auctions of Shares.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics. XCIII (1979), 
675-89.
are submitted in Wilson’s model, when there is positive cost it is better to 
think of seller as a cost minimizer together with the assumption that good 
is durable for just 1 period. Buyers are then giving demand schedules and 
at equilibrium market clears. In the section Stackelberg Game, we present a 
more general model in which firms are Stackelberg leader and consumers are 
followers and we analyze equilibrium of demand and supply functions.
Although Grossman^^ assumes a deterministic industry demand and al­
lows only firms to behave strategically, as a remark he mentions about the 
possible roles of consumers such as behaving monopsonisticly, misrepresent­
ing individual demands in various contexts. In conclusion of his paper as a 
future research he suggests modeling of buyer choice in finding the correct 
model of imperfect competition.
Binmore and Swierzbinski^® is a very recent paper studying the various 
auction formats in multi-unit auctions. This paper is in their advisory paper 
series to the dVeasury and the Bank of England. They compare uniform and 
discriminatory auctions by allowing bidders to behave strategically by their 
demand functions. Bidders true demand functions are derived from a quasi- 
linear utility function. They criticize Merton Miller and Milton Friedman 
who advised in favor of uniform auctions and so influenced the USA in start­
ing to experiment uniform auctions. They state that single-unit auction and 
multi-unit auction are different. For the former, two types of auctions are 
compared; first price and second price auctions. Though the seller expects 
the same revenue in both types of auctions, because of transparency it pro-
^^Grossman, “Nash".
^®Binmore, K. and J. Swierzbinski., “Uniform or Discriminatory?.” Unpublished. Au­
gust 1998.
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vided and its simplicity second-price auctions are advocated by economists 
and used in practice. On the other hand, the theory of multi-unit auc­
tions is not well developed and one can not guarantee revenue equivalency 
for the seller for various auction formats. Depending on the information on 
the seller about buyers demand functions, different formats perform better in 
terms of revenue. When buyers are allowed to submit any decreasing demand 
functions, they conclude that it is wrong to consider uniform auction as a 
generalization of second-price auction to multi-unit case because bidders do 
not optimize when they give their true demand functions in uniform auction. 
They find many equilibria in uniform auction so there is strategic uncertainty. 
However, there is a unique pure strategy equilibrium in discriminatory auc­
tion, in which true clearing price is obtaiiunl. This in turn contradicts Miller 
and Friedman’s advise. In their paper, seller is not a player. He just commits 
himself to supply certain number of bonds. Then buyers pick demand func­
tions such that market clears. It can be seen as the extension of Wilson^  ^
on share auctions to multi-unit case. This is also special case of Stackelberg 
game that we introduce. Think of seller to make a vertical supply function 
commitment then buyers play Nash with their demand functions. In our 
work we do not require buyers true demand functions to come from utility 
maximization problem, we just depend on their declarations.
When we consider consumers as players with demand functions together 
with the firms playing with supply functions, we think of oligopolistic mar­
kets from the point of view of “double auction” in which sellers make offers 
and buyers make bids. This approach is very much encouraged in Sonnen-
Wilson, “Share”.
11
schein^®. He relates oligopoly theory to the auction theory and he himself 
mentions an example of a simple game in which both parties have strategic 
role. Furthermore, he emphasizes the need for specification of institutional 
framework and stresses the importance of it in the development of oligopoly 
theory. He sees the works of experimentalist economics such as Plot^® in this 
direction and gives very much credit. The ideas introduced in Sonnenschein^® 
form the basic motivation in our work. We model games distinguished by 
different institutional assumptions and study the implications of these mod­
els.
The plan of this study as follows; We proceed with the section The Model 
in which we introduce the model in general. Then the section Nash Games fol­
low. There consumers either organized or unorganized play Nash with firms. 
We cover cases when firms produce with zero cost and positive marginal 
cost. In each case whether consumers are organized or not leads to different 
games. Also number of firms and consumers whenever matters leads to differ­
ent games. Symmetric Nash equilibrium of all these games are given. Most of 
them are shown to be unique. On the basis of price, total quantity produced, 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and total social welfare comparisons are 
made with the outcome of Cournot-Nash game. Limit results are provided. 
Then, we introduce the Stackelberg Games: There firm is Stackelberg leader 
and consumers as organized are followers. Whether marginal cost of the firm 
is positive or zero leads to different games there as well. The unique Stack-
2*Sonnenschein, H., “Comment.”, In Frontiers of Economics, eds. K. J. Arrow and S. 
Honkapohja, 171-177, 1985.
^®Plot, C. R., “Industrial Organization Theory and Experimental Economics.”, Journal
of Economic Literature. XX (December 1982), 1485-1527.
30Sonnenschein, “Comment”.
12
elberg equilibrium is given at each game. Finally, we compare outcomes of 
these games among themselves and with the outcome of Cournot-Nash game. 
These constitute our four theorems. In the last section we conclude.
13
CHAPTER 2
THE MODEL
We are in a market for a particular good in the economy. In this market there 
are n consumers and m firms, where n, m are positive integers. Consumers are 
identical with their demand functions and firms are identical with their cost 
functions. Each consumer has an affine demand function, D{P) = a -  bP, 
where a > 0 and b > 0. We assume the slope parameter, b is known, whereas 
the intercept term, a is private to each consumer. Thus, consumers have an 
option to manipulate their intercept terms either individually or in an orga­
nized manner. If they are not organized, each consumer is picking a positive 
number, 7  > 0 for his intercept term a and so giving a demand function, by 
aiming to maximize his consumer surplus. If they are organized, consumer 
union (CU) plays on behalf of consumers by manipulating the intercept term 
of the aggregate demand by aiming to maximize total consumers’ surplus. 
Note that true aggregate demand is AD(P) = na — nbP and CU is giving 
AD{P) =  r  — nbP, where F > 0. We assume that the contract among con­
sumers is the equal division of aggregate quantity demanded at the resulting 
equilibrium price. Since consumers are identical, this assumption is the most
14
appropriate one. After division, each consumer can calculate his consumer 
surplus and compare with the one he obtains when they are not organized. 
On the other hand, each firm has a quadratic cost function, C{q) =  
where a  > 0. Though form of the cost function is known, cost parameter 
a  is private to firms. Thus, firms have an option to misrepresent their cost 
parameters. Note that quadratic cost function implies linear marginal cost 
function MC{q) = 2aq, which in turn implies a supply function q{P) =  ¿ P  
where slope parameter is private to firms. Thus, each firm by picking a non­
negative slope parameter /? > 0, in fact by picking a non-negative number for 
cost parameter, is making a linear supply function commitment, q{P) = ¡3P 
where (J ^  0. Then, firms’ strategies are their supply functions, in particular 
their slope terms.
Given firms’ supply function commitments and consumers’ demand func­
tion commitments, we define outcome price, P , as the number such that 
aggregate supply equals to aggregate demand, i.e, P  satisfies
m n
^ q m  = Y ,D i{P )  (2.1)
i=l
Note that outcome price is a function of supply and demand functions and 
such a number exists and unique since supply functions are linear and demand 
functions are affine.
15
CHAPTER 3
NASH GAME
Consumers either organized or unorganized play Nash with firms. We are 
only intiuested in symmetric equilibria.
D efin ition  1 Let (7 *)"=i  ^ of strategies of consumers and
be a list of strategies of firms. We say the list ((7 *)-b, ,(/?*)" J  forms a 
Nash equilibrium in intercept terms of consumers and slope terms of firms 
when other agents stick to their strategies in the list, if for each consumer 
maximizes
CS^
p - b P i ' r )  ^
= f  ( j  -  p ( j ) h  -  b p m (3.1)
with respect to for any positive intercept term,'y, where P{'y) is the outcome 
price and solved from (1) for each 7  and for each firm ß* maximizes
Hi =  P(ß)(ßP(ß)) -  a (ß P (ß )f  (3.2)
with respect to for any non negative slope term, ß, where P{ß) is the outcome 
price solved from (1)·
When consumers are organized, we define Nash equilibrium as follows:
16
D efin ition  2 Let F* be a particular strategy of consumer union and let 
(/?*)^i be a list of firms’ strategies. We say the list (F*,(/?*)^i) forms a 
Nash equilibrium in intercept term of aggregate demand and slope parame­
ters of supply functions when other agents stick to their strategies in the list, 
if r* maximizes total consumer surplus, TCS
TC S
- I
T-nbP{r) ,
-  P ( m  -  bnP{r)) (3.3)
with respect to for any non negative F, where P(F) is solved from (1) as
nb+mi)· ’ maximizes
n, = p m u p m  -  awp(0w (3.4)
with respect to for any positive slope term /?, where P{/3) is solved from (1) 
r ___as nb-\-(Tn~\)P*
Cournot-Nash Game
In Cournot-Nash game, consumers are not players. They submit their true 
demand functions. Given aggregate demand, firms compete through declear­
ing quantities. Typical firm’s problem.
CL 1
i=\
(3.5)
Now we proceed case by case and give equilibrium strategies;
Case: a = 0, n > l ,  m > 2
In this case firms produce with zero cost and there are at least one consumer 
and two firms.
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P rop osition  1 Let 7 * be equal to a and /?* be equal to 00. Now, the list 
((7 *)"=i, (/?*)^x) forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Suppose that firm j deviates from the proposed bunch of strategies. 
Firm j ’ s problem is to maximize its profit by picking a non-negative number 
or infinity for its slope term. Now, AD{P) = na — nbP since each consumer 
tells the true intercept term. Since other firms give infinity for their slope 
terms aggregate supply is F  =  0 line, i.e., quantity axes. Firm j can not 
change aggregate supply by giving non-negative finite number so it will obtain 
zero profit. Since announcing infinity for its slope term also gives zero profit, 
it is one of best responses. Return to typical consumer’s problem, since firms 
supply at zero price, when he announces a positive number, 7  , his surplus 
C 6’i(7 ) =  1{a -  f ). When he gives a, CSi{a) = ^ .  If 7  < a, then a = ^  + e 
for some £ > 0. Then CSi{a) = 26·*·^ +  !^  CSi{j) =  ^  +  Clearly, the 
former is bigger. If 7  > 2o, then CSi{'y) < 0, which is less than CSi{a) since 
the latter is positive. If a < 7  < 2o, suppose that CSi{'y) > CSi{a). Then 
2ja  — 77  > aa. This leads to o > 7 . Contradiction. So, when each of other 
consumers announces a 7  and each firm announces an 00, announcing a is 
the best response for the consumer i. In fact whatever the other consumers 
announce, a maximizes consumer i’s surplus as long as a firm announces 
00. Thus, he does not want to deviate. Therefore, the bunch of strategies 
in which consumers tell their true intercept term and firms tell their true 
marginal cost functions turns out to be Nash Equilibrium. QED
P rop osition  2 Now, the list ((a)"^i, (00) ^ 1) forms a unique srjmmetric Nash 
equilibrium.
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Proof: Assume that each consumer announces a 7  0, i.e., there are sym­
metric strategies on the side of consumers. Then AD{P) =rvy -  nbP. Note 
that 7  need not be equal to 7 *. Also assume that each firm except firm j 
announces a non-negative finite slope term, /?. Consider firm j ’s problem: 
Firm j will try to maximize (2) by giving a ¡3j > 0. Outcome price is solved
from (1) as P(Pj) = - ■. Then firm j ’ s problem
maxP(/3j)(^jP(/3j)) 
s. to ¡3j > 0
Set the Lagrangian as L =  order
derivatives
—  = 23
 ^{nb + {m — 1)3 + 3j)^ ''nb + {m — 1)3 + 3j
dL
+  (-
n7
f  + P
dyL -  pj
Case 1 : Assume that 3 j  > 0· Then // =  0 and ^  =  0. From which, obtain 
3j =  {m—l)3+'i^b. Note that m > 1 . If m=2, then 3j =  Since nb > 0,
3 j  /  3. Similarly, when m > 2, suppose that 3 j  = P- Then p  =  < 0
Contradiction to 3 j  0· Case 2: Assume that 3 j  = 0. Then /i > 0. If ^ > 0, 
then this is contrary to the symmetricity of strategies of the firms. Consider 
the case /? =  0. Then ^  > 0 since 7  > 0 and // > 0 . Then maximum can 
not be at 3 j  =  0 for firm j when other firms give zero. Therefore, for this case, 
i.e. m y  1 and firms produce with zero cost, when each consumer announces 
the same 7  > 0, there are no symmetric, non-negative, finite equilibrium 
strategies on the side of firms. This is true for 7  =  o in particular. We know 
from Proposition 1, when each firm annonces 00, announcing a maximizes
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each consumer’s surplus and so ((o)"=i, (oo)J^ J  is a Nash Equilibrium. So 
we conlude that it is the unique symmetric one. QED
Lem m a 1 Consider the Cournot- Nash game for this case. Now, for q* =  
the list {q*)^i forms a unique symmetric Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Note that for this case a  =  0. Typical firm’s problem is given in (3.5). 
First order condition for this problem, ( |  — qi) +  q j i^ )  =  0. Prom
which, q* = ^^ — ^ {YУiLı Qi)· Since we are interested in symmetric equilibrium 
strategies, q* = y  -  \{m  -  1)(7*. From which, q* =  Note that second 
order derivative of the objective function is which is negative for any 
non-negative quantity choice. Thus, when other firms submit q* = 
q* = - 2^  globally maximizes firm’s profit and is the unique symmetric Nash
equilibrium. QED
We denote market price, total quantity produced, consumer’s surplus, firm’s 
profit and total welfare by P, Q, C 5, 11 and SW  respectively and put su­
perscript C — N  and C P N  to them to indicate that they are outcomes of 
Cornout-Nash game and the game where consumers play Nash together with 
the firms, respectively.
P rop osition  3 P ^ -^  > P ^^^ , C S ^ -^  < C S ^^^ , >
and < SW ^P^.
Proof : We know that P ^p^  = Q. Since each firm produces total quan- 
tity produced, 0'^-" =  Then p c -"  =  >
0. So pP^~^ > pP^P’^ . Since in the game where consumers play Nash together 
with firms total quantity produced is determined by the demand side and
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each consumer announces o, so ~ an. Since < 1 ,
At =  | ( l  -  each consumer will consume a — hP^~^ =
a m
Then C'SC-" =  /„"*■ ( f  -  lt)dt -  t ( l  -  =  jifeSiF' know from
Proposition 1, =  1^ . Clearly, C S^~^ < . Regarding the
individual firms profit, = 0 since they sell at zero price and =
f(^ “  ~  b(m+i)^  · ^he latter is positive, > E^^^. Since
we define social welfare as the sum of total consumer surplus and total profit, 
^ and similarly
Since So we are done. QED
P rop osition  4
lim P ^ -^
m—^ oo
lim
m—KX)
lim C S ^ - ’^
m—^ oo
lim E^-^m—>oo
lim S W ^ - ^m—>oo
p C P N
q C P N
C S C P N
ECPiv
SWCPN
Proof: Straightforward. QED
C orollary 1 The outcome of the game where consumers and firms play Nash 
is the same with the competitive equilibrium outcome for this case.
Proof: It follows from the standard result that as the number of firms goes 
to infinity in the limit the outcome of Cournot-Nash game arrives to the 
competitive equilibrium outcome and the Proposition 4. QED
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Case: a  =  0, n > l ,  m =  l
For this case there is natural monopoly producing with zero cost and at least 
one consumer.
P rop osition  5 Let 7 * be equal to and (3* be equal to bn. Now, the
list ((7 *)"=!,/?*) forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proof : Let P  be the price satisfing bnP = na—nbP. Then P = ^-  Note that 
this is the price when each consumer announces a and the firm announces 
nb. Now, ^  > P. To see this suppose the contrary. Then This
leads to (4n — 3) < 0. Contradiction. So, ^  > P. Lets check whether 
consumer i wants to deviate. Assume all other consumers announce 7 * and 
the firm announces ¡3*. Consumer i will solve (3.2). Firstly, 7  must be 
smaller than a. To see this suppose the contrary. Then j  > a. Then 
'f — bP > a — bPioT all P  > 0. Let P (7 ) be the outcome price when consumer 
i announces 7  and P(n) be the outcome price when consumer i announces a. 
Note that 7 * < a since < 1· This will guarantee that when consumer
i gives a or any value bigger than a, he will consume positive amount. Since 
a—bP < y —bP for all P  > 0, aggregate demand, AD{P) will be less at each 
price when consumer i gives the former. Moreover, since aggregate supply, 
AS{P) — (3*P — nbP, which is a linear function so when the consumer i 
announces a rather than 7 , AD  and AS  will intersect at a lower price, that 
is, P(u) < P il) · Remember that the firm announces nb and all consumers 
except consumer i announces 7 *. When consumer i announces a, P(a) is the 
outcome price and less than P. Then ^  > P{a). This will guarantee that 
remaining consumers will consume positive amount. Since P(o) P (7 ),
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remaining consumers will consume more, whereas consumer i will consume 
less when he announces a. Now, calculate CSi(a) — — lt)d t —
P(a)(a — bP{a)) =  (a — 6P (a))(■'“—2-^ ). Note that CSi{a) is also equal to 
/p(a)(® ~  bt)dt. Now, since Р{'у) > P{a) and о > 0 and 6 > 0,
a a
/  (o -  bt)dt > (a -  bt)dt
J Ріа) J P(y)IP(a P{
Consumer i’s surplus when he announces 7  is C Stij) = ~ ~
F (7)(7  — ЬР{'у). Note that since 7  > o, 7  =  о +  e for some e > 0. Put a + e 
instead of 7  in CSi{-y) and obtain CSi{'y) as | ( o  — bP{'y)) — ^ (a  — b P (j)y  -  
Р('у)(а -  ЬР('у)) +  fe +  2(a — bP{-y))e — Р{'у)е, which is equal to
-  i* )*  -  i ’ t'I'H“ -  +  2(a -  ЬРЬ))() -  P(7)e),
a
which in turn equals to fp(j)(a ~ bt)dt +  f  e -  +  2(o -  bP{')))e) -  Р (7 )б.
After a little algebra, CSi{j) =  fp(j)(a -  bt)dt -  Since -  bt)dt >
fp(7)(^ -  bt)dt and left hand side of inequality is CS'j(a), C 6’,(a) > CSi{j). 
Thus, 7  < o· Suppose that consumer i announces a 7  > 0 such that at the 
resulting outcome price he consumes zero, for example very small 7  > 0. 
Then his surplus is zero. However, if he announced a, he would obtain 
positive surplus. So 7  must be such that at the resulting outcome price he 
consumes positive amount. Since ^  > P  and 7  < a , this implies that 
all consumers should consume positive amount when consumer is surplus is 
maximized. Now, define P  as the price satisfing (n — 1)7 * — (n — 1)6P =  
nbP. Note that this is the price when we exlude the consumer i. Then 
P  =  (n-Ob+Tfr- ^^ bat  ^ < P,
AD{P) = <
(n -  1)7 * -  (n -  1)6P  if P  >  ^
7  +  (n — 1)7 * — nbP if P  < ^
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Then P(7) = P. and it this price consumer i will consume zero so his surplus 
is zero. However, by giving a he can obtain positive surplus. So, V j < Pb: 
7 can not be the best response of consumer i. Thus, P b <  ' j  <  a, i.e.,
(^2n-W 6 ^ t—’
A D { P )  =
(n  -  1)7* -  (n -  l ) b P  if P  > ^
7 + (n — 1)7* — n b P  if P  < j
Consider the function G {P )  = 7 + (n — 1)7* — n b P  VP > 0. Now, 
G {P )  = A D { P )  VP < j  . Now, If  ^ > P, then  ^ > P(7). To see this. 
Assume that ^   ^ > P· Suppose that  ^ < P {'y ). Now, P {'y )  is the price
satisfing A D { P )  = A S {P ) .  Since  ^ > P, A D { P )
A D { P )  = <
(n -  1)7* -  (n -  1)6P if P  > ^
7 +  (n -  1)7* nbP if P  < ^
Consider the case  ^ =  P(7)· At this price AD{P{'y)) =  (n — 1)7* — (n — 
1)6P(7) and AS{P{'j)) =  nbP{'y). Then P (7) =  P. But then  ^ =  P. Con­
tradiction. Proceed with the case  ^ <  P (7). At such an price AD{P{'y)) =  
(n — 1)7* -  (n — 1)^P(7 ) A5'(P(7)) =  nbP. But then 1 = P. Con­
tradiction. So  ^ > P(7)· Note that if  ^ =  P, then P{j) = P = l ·  Since 
then
(n -  1)7* -  (n -  1)6P if P  > ^
7 +  (n -  1)7* - n b P  if P  < ^
By definition of P, ( n - l ) 7 * - ( n - l ) 6P  =  nbP. Since AS  and AD  intersect at 
a unique point and  ^ =  P, it follows that AS{P) -  AD{P). Then P  =  P{'y) 
by definition of P (7 )· Now, ii) Let 7 be such that j  G [^ , f].If 7 =  7 *^  then 
AD{P) =  n7* — nbP. Then P{'y) = This is clearly smaller than ^  = I-
A D { P )  =
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So  ^ > P (7 ). Now,
A D { P )  =
j - b P  if P  > ^
7 + (n — 1)7* — n b P  if P  < ^
Note that 7 < a and 7* < a. Suppose that P { ' j )  >  Then A D { P { j ) )  = 7 -  
6P(7) and A S { P { j ) )  = n b P i 'j ) .  From A P(P(7)) = A S iP i 'y ) ) ,  P { l )  = nb-\-b'
Then since 7 < a, P(7) = ^  < |; = P. At the very beginning we
showed that ^  > P. Then ^  > P  > P(7). Contradiction. So P(7) < 
Then V7 G (7*,a] :  ^ > P(7)· Combining all the results obtained so far 
V7 e (P6, a] :  ^ > P { l )  and for J  ^  Pb, ^  =  P { j ) .  Now, if 7 G (7*, a], then
7 -  6P if P  > ^
A D { P )  = {  ~  \
7 + (n — 1)') ' -  n b P  if P  ^ ^
We showed previously 7* > P(7). Consider the function, G {P )  = 7 + 
( n - 1)7*-nftP  VP > 0 . Now, G(P) = A P (P ) VP < ^ . Since 7 G (7*,a] 
and so I > i  > P(7)· So V7 G (7*, a] : G { P { ^ )  =  AD(P(7)). If 7 = 7*, 
then A D { P )  =  n Y  -  n b P  VP > 0 . Clearly, G {P )  =  A D { P )  VP > 0 . 
And so G(P(7)) = A P (P (7 ))·
If 7 G [P6, 7 *)> then
 ^ (n -  1)7* -  (n -  1)6P if P  > ^
7 + (n — 1)7* — n b P  if P  < ^
We showed that V7 G (£6,7*] : P(7) < I  Then G ( P { ^ ) )  = A D { P { j ) )  
and if f  = £ , ^(7) = P  = i  and so for 7 = P6, G(P(7)) = A D { P { ^ ) ) .  We 
also showed that if 7 < Pb, then C S i{ j )  = 0 and if 7 > a, then C S i{a ) >  
C S i{^ ) .  Now, C S i{ j )  is a continuous function and [P b ,a ] is a compact 
interval so C S i{'y )  arrives its maximum in this interval. Then the problem is
A D { P )  =  <
max CS,
7G[P6,a] i(7 ) = /  0^
7-6P(7)
( t  -  l t ) d t  -  F (7)(7 -  №(7))
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Since V7 € [Pb, a] : A D { P { ' j ) )  =  G (P { 'y ) )  and by definition of P(7), 
A S iP i- r ) )  = A D iP i- y ) )  =  G (F(7 )). Then V7 e (£6, a) : £(7) =
Put it into objective function. F.O.C. for this problem, - ( 1  -  +
1 \ (n-l)7· \ I (n-l)7· I 7 ) ---L-f-Yfl _  J_) _  iüzllll) — n Aftpr~ ^ )  2n 2nb ^  2nb) 2n6W ti 2n> 2n ; — U. A lte r
arranging terms, one obtains a2n(2 n -  1) + 7*(n -  1) = 7(4n^ -  1). When 
we replace 7* with we obtain Y  = j ^ E ^ ·  So 7® satisfies first order
condition. One can verify that Y  € {P b ,a ) .  Now second order derivative of 
the objective function; - | 7 (1  ~  ~  ^ ( 1  ~  ~  ^ ( 1  “  2^). which is
negative for any non-negative 7 and so in particular for each element from 
the interval [P b ,o ]· Then Y  maximizes C S i( Y  over positive real numbers, 
when every other consumer announce 7* and the firm announces bn. So Y  
is the best response of consumer i to others proposed strategies and Y  =  Y -  
Since consumers are identical, 7* is the best response of each consumer when 
each of remaining consumers stick to 7* and the firm sticks to bn. Lets check 
whether the firm wants to deviate. Suppose that consumers announce the 
same 7 > 0 , the firm will solve (3 .3 ) by picking a non-negative slope coeffi­
cient, ß. Note that P {ß )  is solved from (1) as P [ß )  -  Then the firms 
problem becomes
It is clear that objective function is continuos function of ß. First order condi­
tion for this problem, 2 ( + = 0 . When we arrange the
terms we observe that 7 disappears. This means the firms choice is indepen­
dent of particular value of 7 rather it depends on their symmetricity. Then 
we obtain ß* = nb. Second order derivative is
At ß* it is negative. One can verify that n(/?*) > n(^) V/? > 2nb. Then we
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can restrict the domain to a compact interval [0,2n6]. Since profit function 
is continuos function of /?, it arrives its maximum in this restricted compact 
domain. Note that P* =  bn is the only point first order derivaitive vanishes 
and second order condition is satisfied, we conclude that P* —  bn maximizes 
profit function over non-negative real numbers and so it is the best response 
of the firm to consumers each of whom sticks to a 7 > 0 and so in particular 
to (7*)?-i = (^^r^)?=i· Therefore we conclude that the list ((7*)”=!,/?*) 
forms a Nash Equilibrium. Q E D
Proposition 6 Lei 7* and P* as in  P ro p o s itio n  5 . Now , the lis t ((7 *)¿Li>/^ *) 
fo rm s  a un ique sym m e tric  N ash equ ilib rium .
P ro o f: Suppose there exists another symmetric bunch of strategies, { { ‘j ) ^ ^ i ,P )  
which forms a Nash Equilibrium. Since each consumer announces the same 
■y >  0 , P must be equal to P* = bn from the firms problem in the proof of 
Proposition 5 . Then 7 must be different than 7*. Now, a is different than 
7*. Let’s check whether ((o)"_i,/?*) forms a symmetric Nash equilibrium or 
not. Consider consumer i: if he announces a, Р іа )  =  ^  —  P - At this price 
he will consume a -  b { ^ )  =  f. His surplus C 5 ,(a) = / | (a  -  b t)d t =  If 
he gave 7 ’ = - then
A D ( P )  =
(n -  l)a -  (n -  l ) b P  if P  > ^  
7* -b (n -  l)a  - n b P  if P  < ^
Since ^  > P  and P  > P(7*), P { Y )  = And he will con­
sume at this price as 7* -  b P {y * )  = 7* -  surplus can be
calculated from, C S ^ iY )  =  f  (7* -  b P { Y ) )  -  ¿(7* -  b P ( Y ) ) ^  -  P { Y ) { Y  -
bPiY)) = | ! 4n(4n^-3n+l)(4n -l)-(4n^_-y^+lp^  ^ ^
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6 is the corresponding coefficient. Note that C S i{a )  = | .^ Suppose that 
C S i{ 'y * )  < C S i{a ). Then 6 <  1. Then (4 n^  — 3 n + l)(4 n(4 n — 1) — 4 n^  — 
3n + 1 -  2(4n  ^ -  n + 1)) < n^(4 n -  1) .^ This leads to (4 n^  -  2n + 1) < 0 . 
Contradiction since n > 2 . So C S i{ j * )  >  C S i{a ). Then when the firm an­
nounces /?* = bn and each of other consumers announces j  —  a, announcing
7 = a is not the best response of consumer i. Thus, is not a
Nash equilibrium. Now, let 7 be such that 7* < 7 < a. Let’s check whether 
((7)"_i, /?*) forms a Nash equilibrium. Note that 7 = 7^* -t- (1 — t )a  for some 
t  e  (0 , 1). Then 7 = ~  ^  ^ (O’ 1)·
Let’s check whether consumer i wants to deviate, if he announces 7, then his 
surplus C S i{^ )  =  f (7  -  b P {^ ) )  -  ¿ ( 7  -  b P i j ) ) ^  -  P (7 ) ( 7  -  b P { j ) ) ,  where
^  from (1) using A D { P )  =  n { j  -  b P ) and A S {P )  =  /3* P  = bnP . 
After a little algebra, C S i{y )  =  Replace 7 with a **”"!,)“  ■ Then
consumer i’s surplus is calculated as CS,(7 ) = if he
announces 7* while other consumers announce 7 and the firm announces /3*, 
then P { j * )  = 6 > i  ^  > ^(7) > '^(7 *)· Now, his sur­
plus can be calculated by replacing ^(7*) with , 7 with
from C S i iY )  =  f  (7* -  b P { j* ) )  -  ¿(7* -  b P { Y ) Y  -  P { j * ) { j *  -  b P { j* ) ) .  
After a bit massy algebra, C S ,{ Y )  =  g (-‘n -^3n+i+t(n-j)Ki2n -^5n+3+3t(n-i)) 
Suppose that C S i{^ )  >  C S i{ Y ) .  Then l .^’i!r -3n+l+^(nJ)Kl2n -^5n+3+3t(n-l)) < 
(^4n-i)-‘+2t(4n-i)-3_^  ^ After a little algebra, this reduces to 3271"^ —4 8 n -^l-3 8 n^  — 
q. I2 i(n -  l)n^ -  5ni(n -  1) + 1 0 in^(4 n -  1) -  9 ni(4 n -  1) -1- 3 -h 3 i(4 n -  
1) + 3 i(n — 1) + 3 i^(4 n — l)(n — 1) + 3 in  ^ < 0 , where n > 2 . Contradiction. 
Note that left hand side is positive since 3 2 n^  -  4 8 n^  > 0 , 3 8 n^  -  14n > 0 , 
I 2 t { n  — l)n^ — 5ni(n -  1) > 0  and 10 in^(4 n — 1) — 9 ni(4n — 1) > 0 and other
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terms are positive. Thus, C S i{ 'j* )  >  C S i{ ‘j ) .  So 7 is not the best response 
of consumer i to the other players’ strategy profile in which each consumer 
announces 7 and the firm announces /3*. Thus, ( (7  ■ 7 * <  7  <  a, { {7 ) f ^ i , p * )  
is not a Nash equilibrium. Combining both results, V7 : 7* < 7 < a, 
((7)”_ i,/5*) is not a Nash equilibrium. Now, focus on the values less than 
7*. Let 7 be such that 7  < 7 * ·  Then 7 = ¿7* = for some t € (0 ,1).
Let’s check ((7)"_i,/?*) is a Nash equilibrium or not. Now, all consumers 
except consumer i sticks 7 and the firm sticks to ¡3 *. If consumer i an­
nounces also 7, then the outcome price P {7 )  = as in above. Then 
his surplus C S i{7 )  = f  (7 -  b P m  ~  ¿ ( 7  -  b P i^ ) ?  ~  P (7 ) ( 7  -  b P {7 )) is 
calculated by replacing P (a )  with U  and 7 with After a little alge­
bra, C S г{7 ) =  | i (4t(4n-2)(4n-i)-3t"(4n-2)^^^ consumcr announces 7 * instead,
then there are two cases to be considered. Define P ^  as the price satisfying 
= ni)£l. Then £ 1  = = 2, where t = Note that
if Í < then P { 7 *) =  E l  only consumer i consumes positive amount
at £ 1 . If Í > ¿ Y , then P {7 * )  =  — · To see this suppose 
the contrary. Since
A D { P )  =
7* - b P i f P >  J
7* + (n — 1)7 — n b P  if P  < ?
, P ( Y )  >  2 . But then P { Y )  = £ 1 = > 2 = 121 > Con­
tradiction. So £(7*) = consumer
consumes a positive amount at £(7*). Proceed with the case 7 : 7 = ¿7* for
some (n+l) < Í < 1 . Now, if consumer i announces 7* while other players
stick to their strategies in the proposed bunch strategies, his surplus can be 
calculated by replacing £(7*) with 7* with from
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^^¿(7 *) =  f ( 7 * -  bP{Y))  -  ^(7* -  b P { Y ) f  -  P (7 *)(7 * -  bP{Y)).  After 
a little algebra, CSi{j*) equals to (4n(4n -  1) -  (4n -
2 )(2n — 1 — (n — l)i)  — 2 ((n — l) i  +  l ) ( 4n — 2 )). Note that when consumer 
i announces 7 instead, then his surplus as above is | i ; t^(4n-2)(4n-i)-3t (^4n-2)  ^
Suppose that ^^¿(7) > ^^¿(7*). Then n2(4 i(4n -  1) -  3P{in -  2 )) >  
(2n -  1 -  (n -  l ) i ) ( 16n2 -  4n -  (4n -  2)(2n -  1 -  (n -  l) i)  -  2 ((n -  l) i  +  
(^ 4^  _  2)). Open up brackets in each side, make cancellations, collect the 
terms in one side and obtain 0 > 16n  ^ -  16n^  -  32 in^ +  32 in^ -  16in +  
8n +  4i — 2 +  16Pn^ -  16 i^ n  ^ +  SPn — 2p.  Arrange the terms and obtain
0 > n^(16 —32 i + 16i^)+n^(—16 +  32 i — 16i^ )+ n (—16i +  8 +  8 i^ )+ 4 i — 2 —2i ,^
which in turn can be written as 0 > r i^ [{n  -  1)(16  -  32 i + IGi )^] + n ( - 16i + 
g +  sP) +  4i -  2 -  2p.  Note that i 1-)· 1 7 1-)· 7* CSii'y) M· CSi{Y).
This can be seen in the preceding inequality since as i i->· 1 , right hand 
side goes to zero. Arrange the terms in the preceding inequality a bit more 
2(1 — 2 t + P) > ~ 1)(16  — 32 i -  16i )^ +  n (-lG i +  8 +  8i). Then
H l - 2 t+P) > ( n ( n - l ) 16( l - 2 i + i 2) +  (i6^+g+g^)) > n ( n - l ) 16 ( l - 2 i + i 2).
But then  ^ > n(n -  1)1 6 . Contradiction since n > 2. Thus, V7 : for some 
_i_ < i < 1 , C S i iY )  >  C S i { j )  and so ((7)^ i^,/3*) is not a Nash equi-
n+1
librium. Now, we proceed with the case t  <  Let 7 be such that
-y = t Y  for some 0 < i < Now, all consumers except consumer i
sticks to 7 and the firm sticks to /3*. If consumer i announces 7, his surplus 
as in the previous case C S r« ) = S ( 4 n -  if he devi-
ates to 7*, his surplus again calculated from , C S i{ Y )  =  f  (7* -  b P { Y ) )  -  
A(7* -  b P { Y ) f  -  P { Y ) ( Y  -  b P { Y ) ) ,  where P { Y )  =  T  =  since
1 < F*, i.e, only consumer i consumes positive amount at the outcome
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price. CSi(Y) is calculated by replacing P { Y )  =  and 7 · with
as ¿ ( t e  -
Then («4n-0n(»ei)-y_-2j-(4.n-2in!) < After eliminating
the denominators, making cancellations and collecting the terms in one side, 
one obtains the following inequality 0 < n^ ( - 1 6  + 16i + 28 t)  -  12 t^n^  -  
n l^8i  ^ + n { 8 t  — 8) + i(6i — 4 ). Note that maxumum value for t  can be 
Then ( —16 + 16 i + 2 8 i) and other terms are negative. Contradiction. So 
CSi{Y) >  ^51(7). Thus, ((7)·^!,/?*) is not a Nash equilibrium. Summing 
up the results so far we obtained, while each of other consumers sticks to 7 
and firm sticks to V7 € (0,o] \ {7*} : ((7)^=1,/?*) is not a Nash equilib­
rium Let 7 > a. Then 7 = a -l· e for some e > 0 . Let F  be the price satisfing 
_ i).y -  (n -  l ) b P  = nbP . Then P  =  For P  to be equal to f ,
e must be equal to where n > 2. Let 7 be such that 7 = a -t- e for
 ^ > a» . Assume that each of consumers except consumer i sticks to 7 and 
the firm sticks to /?*. If consumer i announces a then he will consume zero 
since P {a )  = £  > f  · Then CSi{a) —  0 . If consumer announces 7 instead, 
then P { j )  = ^  from (1) by using A D { P )  =  n { j  -  b P ) and A S {P )  =  bnP . 
By using 7 = a-l-e > (<^ + conclude that P(7) > |. But then
CSi{^) < 0 = CSi{a). Thus, V7 : 7 = o -h e for e > is not
a Nash equilibrium. Consider the case 7 = a -I- e for e < · Assume that
that each of consumers except consumer i sticks to 7 and the firm sticks to [3*. 
If consumer i announces 7, as in above P(7) = And C S ip i)  is calculated 
from C S ip i)  = i { l - b P p i ) ) - Y ^ { l - b P p i ) f - P p i ) p ) - b P { ^ ) )  as C5j(7) =
4ttT-Ml — (4a-3(a+€)(g+6) _ a^ +ae-36a-3e^  _ α^ n^ -^ αc7l^-3£αn^ -3c^ 7г'■  ^ pQnsumer 1
---g5--- — 86 86n^
announces a instead, then P(o) = ^ ~2nb^‘'  =  To see this suppose
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contrary and verify that it leads to contradiction. Then from C S i{a )  =  | ( a -  
b P {a )) -  ¿ ( a  -  b P ( a ) f  -  P(a)(a -  b P (a ))  by replacing P(o) with 
and doing a little algebra, CSi(a) =  ^ow,
C S i{a ) > C S i i j )  since -  2ne^ > 0 , where n >  2 . Thus, V7 : 7 =  a +  e 
{qj.  ^ <; . ((7)?=!) /^ *) is not a Nash equilibrium. Combining all, V7 : 7 G
(0,00) \  {7*}, ((7)r=i)/^*) is ^ Nash Equilibrium. Since we know from 
Proposition 5 ((7*)"=i>/^*) is э. Nash equilibrium, it turns out that it is the 
unique symmetric one. Q E D
P rop osition  7  Assum e tha t consum ers are organized. Le t Г* be equal to  ^  
and /3* be equal to bn. N ow, the lis t  (Г*, (3*) fo rm s  a un ique N ash e q u ilib rium .
P ro o f: Let /?* be chosen by the firm. Consumer Union (CU), will solve (3 .4 ). 
Now, total consumers’ surplus (TCS) is T C S {T )  = |(Г  -  ЬпР(Г)) -  (Г -  
6п Р (Г ))^ -Р (Г )(Г -6п Р (Г )) , where Р(Г) is F.O.C. for this problem:
( ^ ) ( д а ^ )  +  ^ Replace ¡3* with bn and solve for Г. Then
pc _  ^  _  p· pind the second order derivative (S.O.D.) of the objective 
function as ^  ^  < 0 ѴГ > 0. Moreover, since objective function is
continuos and first order derivative vanishes at Г* , we conclude that T C S  
arrives its maximum at Г over (0,00). Now, let a Г > 0 be chosen by CU. 
The firms problem is given in (3 .5 ) for o; =  0 and m =  1, of course. Then 
the firm’s problem
тахП(/?) = (— — -  
g  ^ ' ^nb + 13
__\ _F.O.C. for this problem: ( ^ ) ( p : f ; 3 y i  +  =  0 · One can verify that
r  cancels out and (3  ^ is solved as bn =  P*. S.O.D. of the profit function is 
calculated as which is negative for p * =  bn. One can verify that
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n(/?*) > n(j5 ) V/? > 2bn. So we can restrict domain to a compact interval,
[0 , 26n]. Since profit function is continuous, it arrives to its maximum on 
a compact domain. Since p *  is the only point satisfying both F.O.C. and 
S.O.C., it maximizes profit of the firm over [0, oo). Thus, it is the best 
response of the firm for any T > 0  chosen by CU, in particular to F* = 
Since CU’s unique best response to P* =  bn is F* = the list (F * ,P * )  is 
the unique Nash equilibrium. Q E D
Lem m a 2  C ons ide r the C ou rn o t-N ash  Game. N ow, ^  is the m o ­
n o p o lis t’s p ro fit  m axim iz inQ  level o f  ou tput.
P ro o f : Since m =l, Cournot Nash Game reduces to natural monopolist’s 
problem. Inverse industry demand is P  = f  -  and total revenue (TR) 
equals to Q (| — ^ Q ) ·  Marginal Revenue (MR) is | — 2bnQ. Since F.O.C. 
is necessary and sufficient for this problem, monopolist’s profit maximizing 
level of output solved from 0  = M C  = M R  as Q ’^  = Q E D
As a new notation the variables with superscript M  belong to monopoly
with superscript C U P N  belong to the game in which
consumer union
Proposition 8 The fo llo w in g  is tru e  :
structure and those
and firms play Nash.
p M  y p C P N  > p C U P N
q c p n  > q C U P N
^CUPN y C S C P N  ^ c s ^
Y lC P N  > Y^CUPN
y >
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(when n > 2 ,  inequalities are strict.)
P ro o f: Firstly, let’s find the outcomes of three structures regarding these 
variables: we know that Put it into inverse industry demand and
find At this price each consumer will consume Then individual
consumer surplus, C S ^  =  -  \ t ) d t  -  f f  = |j· Monopolists profit
= P ^ Q ^  = Then the total social welfare under monopoly, S W ^  - 
„^ 4 - = 2 ^ . Return to the game where consumers and firms play Nash:
We know that for 7* = 7 ^ ^  i { 7 * )7= i,P * )  forms a unique
Nash equilibrium. From, P ^ ^ ^  = P ^ ^ ^  =  2b{4n-i) ■ consumer at
this price will consume Y ~ b P ^ ^ ^  =  Then total quantity demanded
(total quantity produced), A D { P )  = Surplus for each consumer can
be calculated from CS®™ = -  i t ) d t  -
And the firms profit is = P ^ p x ( ff.p cp > > ) ^
Then total social welfare calculated as SW<^p x  = =
o^ n[(4n-2)^ +2(4n^ -j^  Now, return to the game where CU plays Nash with the 
firms: We know that for F* = ^  and /?* = 6n, (F*,/3*) forms a unique 
Nash equilibrium. Now, from p c u P N  ^  ^ quantity
demanded (total quantity produced) at this,price, =
Since consumers equally share this amount, each consumer takes |. 
Then his surplus is calculated from -  \ t ) d t  -  = fi·
And the profit of the firm is = pCUPN ^p.pcuPN^^ ^  ^  phen
total social welfare is calculated as
Now, we have all the results to make comparisons: We know that P ^  —  
a_ pCUPN ^  ^  and P ^ ^ ^  =  If n = 1 , then P ^ ^ ^ ^  = P ^ ^ ^ .
Since ^ > f) ^ pC P N  > p c u P N  j o^lds for n = 1 . If n > 2 , then
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^ 3· Suppose not. Then < |· This leads to 4 n -  4  < 0 .
Since n > 2, contradiction. Since p^rf) ^  4n-^ i^ ) · Combining both,
p M  y  pC P N  y  p c u P N  fQj. ^ > 2. We know that q c u p n  _ ^
and = n|[|^Ei)· By a similar way in the prices, >- >-
q c u p n  i o x n > 2  and ^ forn  = 1. About consumer’s
surplus, we know that C S ^  =  = 2fr(4„_E)is and
Clearly, y  C S ^  for n > 1. When n = 1, = \
Then, y  C S ^  for n = 1 . If
n  >  ¿4n'-i^  < l ·  Suppose not. Then ^ l ·  ^his leads to
0  > 8 ri2 -  16n + 8. Since n > 2 , contradiction. Then, 
for n > 2 . Suppose that <  C S ^ ,  i.e, Ei)Z < |.This leads to
0 < — 16n + 10. Since n > 2, contradiction. So >  C S ^ . So,
( jg c u P N  y  y  C S ’^  for n > 2. Regarding the profits, we know that
and = 3^  .Clearly,
for n > 1 . When n = l, = g  and so U ^ u p n  ^  y^c p n  ^^en
n = l , U ^ y  holds. Suppose that for
n > 2. Then < V ’ leads to 8 0 n^  — 1 1 2 n + 3 2 n < 0 . Since
n > 2 , contradiction. Then when n > 2 . Clearly, >
jjC P P N  for n > 2. So, for n > 2. About total
social welfares, we know that S W ^  =
and When n = 1, and so =
S ^ /c u P N  gince ^  -< | ,  S W ^  y  holds for n = 1.
Now, suppose < l.
This leads to 0 > 5 6 n^  -  6 4 n + 8. Since n > 2, contradiction. Then, 
y  for n > 2 . N 0W ,
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Suppose 1 < This leads to 0  > 8n -  1. Since n > 2 ,
contradiction. So, S W ^  y  for n > 2. Combining both, S W ^  y
y  for n > 2. So we are done. QED
As a new notation, any varible with a superscript C belongs to the compet­
itive equilibrium outcome. 31
P roposition  9  The fo llo w in g  is tru e :
lim 7* = a
lim P
n —>oo
n-^oo 
C P N
lirn Q
n->oo
c _
lim C S '
n-^oo
C P N  _
lim ^ lim P ^ ^ ^ ^  = ^  ^ lim = 0
n->oo ¿0  n->oo 60 n->oo
lim = lim Q "  = lim = oo
ji—>· OO Ti—► oo 71—► OO
lim C S ^  = ^  ^ lim =  <  lim C S ^  =
86 Tl-foo 66 26
lim n ’^ = 0 X lim = lim fl^  = lim = oo
lim S W
71-► OO
C =  lim =  lirn S W ^  = lim =  oo
P ro o f: Note that since there is only one firm, industry marginal cost (IMC) 
function equals to MC function which is zero for all non-negative levels of 
production. Then P*^ ’= 0 . Then =  na . Each individual consumer will 
consume a at zero price. His surplus will be = | .^ The firm obtains 
zero profit since it sells at zero price. Then total social welfare will be equal 
¿0 Combining them with the results given in Proposition 8, limits can
be easily verified. QED
®'When we say competitive equilibrium outcome, we mean socially optimal outcome. 
Consider a single-product industry. Let be such that AD{P“) =  IMC{P^)  and
AD{P^) =  9*, where IMC{q)  is the industry marginal cost function. Moreover, if IMC  
function and AD intersect more than one point, then at {P“,q‘‘) social welfare is maxi­
mized.
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Proposition 9 tells that as number of consumer gets very large, they tell the 
truth. In fact, as their number gets large, unless they are organized, they lose 
their ability to manipulate their intercept terms. The outcomes of Nash game 
we define and monopoly structure coincide in the limit. When consumers are 
organized, in the limit individual consumer is still better off compared to the 
situation where they are not organized and monopoly structure .
Case: a y O ,  n > l ,  m > 2
In this case firms are producing with positive marginal cost and there is at 
least one consumer and more than one firm.
Proposition  1 0  Le t 7* be equal to - (n-i)b where 0 =  {1 -
nb+m$*  ^ ( n 6 - h m / 3 * ) 2
b ) and P* be equal to ^  where A  = (m -  2 -  2a n b Y  +
8oinb{rn  -  1). Now , the lis t ((7*)f=i, fo rm s  a Nash e q u ilib rium .
P ro o f: Let a 7 0 be chosen by each consumer and /?* be chosen by
all firms other than firm j. Now, firm j ’s problem is given in (5 ), where 
P { p j)  is obtained from (1) as P {P j)  =  by using A D { P )  =
n(7 -  bP ) and A S {P )  = (m -  1)^*F + p jP .  Set the Lagrangian as L =
n'y —  Oi0 j )  F.O.C. for this problem: -
^ proposed value above
for p *  and solve for p j.  During this a bit massy algebra one can notice 
that 7 cancels out and Pj is found as equal to p *. About the S.O.D., 
we used Mathematica software to take the derivative of F.O.D. with re­
spect to Pj and then to impose Pj =  P*. It supplied the following expres­
sion Focus on the numer­
ator, open up the parentheses and make the cancellations and obtain the
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numerator as 67^ n^ y0* — 6 'y‘^ n ^a {f3* ) ‘^  —  47^n^^*m — 47 n^ 6^ + 8 'y'^n^baP* — 
27^n o^;(/?*)^m^—4o!7^ n®6/0*m—27^n‘*a6^ . Observe that 6y ‘^ n ^P *— A'y‘^ n^P *m  -< 
0 and S j'^n^baP * -  4a j ‘^ n^bp*m  -< 0 since m  > 2  and other terms are neg­
ative. Thus the whole expression turns out to be negative for /?j = /3*. 
Thus, S.O.C is satisfied for p j = P*. Note that if 0  < P j <  profit of 
the firm is non-negative and if P j >- then the profit of the firm is neg­
ative. So we can restrict the domain to a compact interval [0, ¿]. Since 
profit function is continuous function of P j, it arrives its maximum on [0, ]^. 
Since Pj =  P* is the unique point satisfying F.O.C. and S.O.C., it max­
imizes firm j ’s profit on [0,oo). Thus, it is the best response of the firm 
j to others’ strategy profile in which each firm sticks to P* and each con­
sumer sticks to the same 7 0 . Implying P j = P* is the best response
of the firm j to the others’strategy profile in which each firm sticks to P* 
and each consumer sticks to 7*, in particular. Since firms are identical 
this is true for each firm. Let’s turn to typical consumer’s problem: As­
sume that each firm sticks to P* and each consumer other than consumer i 
sticks to 7*. Then consumer i’s problem is as given in (2 ). Now, as in the 
proof of Proposition 5 , let P  be the price satisfying m P *P  =  n {a  -  b P ). 
Then, P  =  Let’s a bit manipulate ^ b + I L
where 6 = ( 1 ---- h r~ w )  obtain ----------- a{nb+p m) — ^ —  Supposewnere 7 1^ ((n-l)fr+;3»m)b+2b^-
n b + m 0t O- (Tt-l)b ( n b + m p * )2
that P  > ^ ·  Then
{nb+P’‘m) < . Then, 62((n -
1) +  2) +  mP*b -  ^
bra one can obtain 0 > ~ 1) + P *m b +  This leads to
0 > p *m b P  + + Now, whenn > 2, ( n - 1 )  > 1. Moreover,
0. So right hand side is positive. Contradiction . So, ^  P . Note
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that when n = 1 , there is no problem in terms of outcome price. So whether 
^  is bigger than F  or not is not interesting. Let’s also prove that 7* a. 
Now,  ^ =  (1 —  ^ positive since n > 1 and P* y  0 and m > 1 .
Suppose that 7* > a. Then f  > y  + ~  0 ^^  can verify that
26 (n - l)b  _  (n-I)6+m ^* , m0" ( i  ^  — a ( (.n-l)b+m0' \
nb+m0 {n b + m 0 'f  (nb+m0’ y  ^  (nfc+m/?*)^' '■<> '' nb+m0' ) ’
Then > % ? r n p f  +  h t S f · Since 9 ^  1 , Contradiction.
So 7* ^ a. Now, we have all the tools to claim that in consumer i’s prob­
lem (5 ), consumer i will not give values bigger than a. To prove this, follow 
the same steps in Proposition 5 . So 7 < a. Let F  be the price satisfying 
1).-^ * _ ( n -  1)6F = mbP. Then F  = If consumer i announces
a, 'y y  0 such that  ^ F, then he will consume zero so his surplus will be 
zero. Then AD{P) will be
AD{P) =
(n -  1)7’ -  (n -  1)6F if F  > ^
n b P  i i P < l7 -I- (n — 1)7*
And by definition of F ,F(7) = F. So F(7) > .^ So consumer i will consume 
zero, if he announced a instead, he would consume positive amount and 
obtain positive surplus. So, any 7 less than Pb can not be the best response 
of consumer i. Thus, Pb <  j  <  a. Note that F  ^  since F  = — and
n > 2 . Note that if n = 1 , there is no need to define F  since there is no
problem in terms of outcome price. Consider the case  ^ G [F, ^]. For all 
such 7 ’s,
'  (n -  1)7* -  (n -  1)6F if F  > ^
7 -1- (n — 1)7* — nbP if F  < ^
Consider the function, G{P) =  7 -l· (n -  1)7* -  nhP VF > 0 . Now, G(F) =  
AD{P) VF < I- We observed above that if  ^ =  F, then P{'j) =  F. Then
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AD{P) =
G{P) = A D {Q  and G{P{'y)) = AD{P{'y)). We need to prove the following 
statement G (£, ^] : f  ^(7)· Let  ^ e  (£, ^]. Suppose the contrary, so 
I < P{-y). Now,F (7) is the price satisfying ylD(F(7)) = AS{P('y)). Proceed 
with the case: I  = P{'y). At this price AD{P{y)) =  ( n -  1)7* -  ( n -  1)6P(7) 
and AS'(P(7)) = m/3*P(j). Then P{j) =  £. Then }  =  P- Contradiction. 
Left with the case  ^ X P(7)· At P(7), A P(P(7)) = (n -  1)7* -  (n -  
1)6P(7) and AS{P{'y)) =  m/3*P{'y) and AD(P{j)) =  AS{P{j)).  From 
which, P(7) = £  Then  ^ ^ P(7) = £  Contradiction. So G (£, ^], 
I P(7). Since G(P) = AD{P) VP < I  G{P{^)) = AD{P{y)) V7 G 
[£6,7*J. (Note that we proved when f  = £ , G{P{j)) =  AD{P{'y))). Let’s 
look at the set (7*, a]. For all elements in this set,
7 -  6P if P  > ^
7 + (n -  1)7* — n b P  if P  < ^
Note that 7 < a and 7* X a. Suppose that P(7) > Then, A D {P { 'y ) )  = 
^  _ bP {'y) =  A S {P { 'y ) )  =  fn /3*P { 'y ) . Note that 7 < a and 7* ^ a. Then 
p i'y '] — — 7 4 ' * ~ I —  P  since / 1 ^ 2  and so  ^
m P *. We know that ^  y  P . But then ^  ^’(7). Contradiction to the
supposition.So P (7 ) -< Then, I  ^  P { l f ) ·  S0V7 G (7*, a] : 1 y  P (7 ). 
Thus, V7 G (7*,o] : G { P { j ) )  =  AP(P(7)).Combining all the results we 
obtained so far, V7 G [P b ,a ] : G {P { 'y ) )  = A P(P(7)). We know that if 
7 -< Pb, then C S i i j )  = 0 -< C S i{a )  and if  ^ f , then C S i{a ) y  C S i{^ ) .  
So maximum of C S i, a continuous function of 7, lies in the compact interval 
[P b ,a ]. So consumer i’s problem
A D { P )  =
max C S i
■ ye[Pb,a] - f
i-bPG) f. 1
-  p(7)(7 -  b P {^ ) )
_  (n-l)7*+7Since V7 G [P b ,a ] ; G { P { ^ ) )  =  A D { P { - f ) ) ,  P { ^ )  =  After a little
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6(n-l)7· I gg
algebra from F.O.C. of this problem, 7*^  is solved as *' where 6 is as
T ' ^  n b +0- m
defined before. = where as before. Putting the corresponding values for /?* 
and 7* and doing a little algebra, one obtains 7*^  as equal to 7*. S.O.D. of the 
objective function with respect to 7 is ^ ( 1  -  ^^6+7^4 )^  ^ which is negative 
for any choice of 7. When each of remaining consumers stick to 7* and each 
firm sticks to /3*, 7^  ^ = 7* is the unique point satisfying F.O.C. and S.O.D. 
is negative for any 7 G [P b ,a ]. We conclude that 7* maximizes consumer 
i’s surplus.Thus, it is the best response of consumer i to the other’ strategy 
profile in which each cinsumer announces 7* and each firm announces P*. 
This is true for any consumer since they are identical. By adding the results 
of typical firm’s problem, we conclude that the list ((7*)"= !, forms a
Nash equlibrium. Q E D
The following lemma provides some limit results related to the Nash game 
in which consumers play Nash with the firms.
Lem m a 3
7 * -< a
lim 7*
n->oo
= a
lim /?*
n-^oo
=
1
lim
n—^ oo
=
a
b
lim (7* -
n->oo
= 0
lim A D { P ^ ^ ^ )
n-^oo
—
m a
2ab
lim 7*
m-^oo
= a
1
lim p*
m-^oo
=
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lim = 0
m->oo
lim (7* -  = a
m -foo
C P N \lim A D { P ^ ^ ^ )  = n a
P ro o f: In the proof of Proposition 10 we showed that 7* -< a. Start with one 
of the limits on slope parameters of firms. Now,
lim /?* = lim
771—>00 m—^ oo
—(m — 2 — 2a n b ) —  y / { m  —  2 —  2a n b Y  + 8 a n b {m  —  1)
—4Q!(m — 1)
/1 I 2anb\ I fí^ 2 2an6V2 i
(1 -  m “  +  V ^
= l i m ------------------
Sctnb   _1_
771 771
m—^ oo (4a  -  ; )^
1
Note that lim„i_>cx. rnp* =  00 since as ¡3* goes to a positive finite number m  
explodes and so lim;„-^ oo 0 = lim^^oo(l -  n b ^ ^ )  = 1 · By using this
- 9
Urn 7* - lim ----------- ^,„^00 m^oo _Q1 + {n -l)b  
(nb-i-mp*
= a
lim = lim
771—^OO
n7
=  0
771—>00 nb +  P*m
since the numerator goes to na, a poitive fixed number, whereas denom­
inator explodes. This implies that in the limit each firm produces zero 
amount since \imm-^oo =  0 · Then lim^^oo(7* -  b P ^ ^ ^ )  - a. Then,
lim„^oon(7 * -  bP^^^) = na. Now,
lim ¡3* =  lim
n - > 0 0  7 7 - > 0 0
—(m — 2 — 2a n b ) —  y / [m  —  2 —  2a n b y  4- 8 a n b {m  —  1) 
—4o;(m — 1)
- 2b
=  lim ---------------------  ,---------------------------------
( f  -  I  -  2ab) -  y/ ( ^  - l ~  2aby + s a n f c l l
2a
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Note that lim„_ o^o  ^ n—^oo (1 -  =  1- Then
lim 7* = lim -
n->oo n-^oo in-^oo if)2  _1_____ 2___ Q _  (n - l) f t
' nb-hniB* (nb+mB*
= lim
+m0’ P^y
n^oo 102 +  +  (6„+m/?-)4
= a
Now, lim„_oo = f  Then each firm
produces in the limit l i m „ _ , o o = 2^· So in the limit total quantity 
produced (total quantity demanded) becomes lim„_,oo So
we are done. Q E D
Lem m a 4  C ons ide r the C orn o u t-N ash  game. L e t q* be equal to 2abn+m+i · 
N ow, the lis t { q * ) ^ i  fo rm s  a unique sym m e tric  N ash e q u ilib rium .
P ro o f: Note that there are more than one firms in the market and each of 
which produces with positive cost. Typical firm’s problem is given in (6). 
F.O.C. for its problem:(f -  <li) ~  Q j^  ~  ^oiqj = 0 . From which qj
is solved as qj —  "2+20^ *' interested in symmetric equilibria
strategies, we impose qj = q* Vj. Then, q* is solved as 9’ = ^abn+m+i-
we check the S.O.D., it is -  2a . Clearly, it is negative for any qj >  0 .
Then, F.O.C. is sufficient as well and when each of other firms sticks to q*, 
q* satisfies F.O.C. of the problem firm j. Thus, maximizes firm j ’s profit 
and so it is the best response of firm j. Since firms are identical, this is true 
for any firm. Thus, is a Nash equilibrium.lt follows from the first
order condition of firm j ’s problem that this Nash equilibrium is the only 
symmetric one. Q E D
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The following lemma indicates the fact that in the limit outcomes of Cornout- 
Nash game and the Nash game in which consumers are players along with 
firms coincide.
Lem m a 5
lim =
m —)-oo
lim =
m —>oo
lim =m—>oo
limC'5 ^'’"^ =
lim n^^^ =
n->oo
lim =
lim C S ^ - ^  =
m->oo 2 6
lim = 0
m —>oo
lim ^
m->oo 26
lim C S ^ - ^  =  0
n—>oo
lim ^n-^ oo 4q6
lim AW «'’« =n->oo 4a6
Proof: Firstly, we know that for q* = a^fenTm+i ’ (9*)i^i forms a unique 
symmetric Nash equilibrium. Then total quantity produced is =
— — . Putting into inverse industry demand gives = f  —2a6n-fm+l  ^ ^  ^ ^
=  fr(2a“n+m+i)' price typical consumer will consume a —
am
=  S eS t T his surplus CS°-'^ =  / “ ‘-+»+· ( s  -  lt)dt -
t(2S ,t::i)2u »„T .u -r i  =  m £ ^ ·  Each firm 's profit is n<^-" =  -
“ (9·)^ =  tgate+ro+iF ' ® °'‘a l w elfare S iy e i- i«  ^  + nCS·^-" =
2mtt6n^ t^t2^ +a^ n^ +^2mnar ffow , we are ready to  take lim its. lim m -.o o ^ 5 * '^~  ^ =
1- Q^ m?· —  1™ _ ____ ______  _ o2 i:  ^ r^ qC P N  _
l i m ^ _ > 0 0  2 b(2abn-l·m-\-lУ ^ ^ . (2a6n)2 2(2a6n +  l)2  ^  2 6 ’
limyy,_oo(f(r -  -  ¿ ( r  -  -  P ^ ^ ^ i r  -  b P ^ n  =  i  by
using the results limy„_ o^o(7* ~  bP^^^) = a and lirnm-^ oo(-P*^ ’^ ^) =  0 ob­
tained in Lemma 4 . limy„^oo =  \\mm^oo{P^^^?{^* ~ «(/?*)')) =  0
since lim,„^oo(^^^^) =  0 and hrUm-^ooP* = Clearly, lim,yi_yoo =
44
1 · abn^a^+a^n _  n lim  — lim  2mabn^a'^+a^nm^ +2mna^
lim„i_,.oo b(2abn+m +iy  limm->oo 2b{2abn+m+l)^
» 1^ 2.2 „ .>_.2
lim^771—>00
2mabn^ a^  , „ 2„  , gnoj
_____ m— ---------- ra—-—
26( +i+igg^g±ll)2
_ na^
”  2b · Observe that limm->oo = 0 ,
lim^-,oo ^  and then lim„i_>oo = lim^_,oo +^m—^o
n^ nm^
Clearly, linin-».oo ^  — lim„_>oo 26(2a 6n + m + l )2 ~   ^ I
lim„_oo =  lim„_oo(f(7 * -  -  ¿(7* -  -  p C P ^ ^  _
))pCPN^ =  0 by using the results lim„_+oo(7 *-^-P^^^) =  0 and lim„_ o^o P^^'^ =  
0 obtained in Lemma 4 . Easily, lim„^oo = lim^^oo =  ^ ·
lim„-,oon^^^ =  =  ¿ s i n c e  lim„^oo(P^^^) =
I and lim„_>oo,
n *  _  1 lim —  lim 2m a b n ^ a ^ + a ^ n T n ^ + 2m n a '^  _
>P —  llmn^oo'jrt' — unin^oo 2b(2abn+m+rp ~
lim __ 2ma6a^+4^+^^.^ ^ ^  lim„_oo = f 4 . We
Iim„^oo 2b(2i,((2a6)2 + i=^i^+^^^^) ^  ^
conjecture that lim„_>oo = 0 . In that case l i m „ ^ o o =
lim„_,oo +  lim n QED
Exam ple 1 : For a = 1 , 6 = 1 , a  = 1 , n = 1 , m = 2 , the following is true: 
p C -N  y  pCPN^ q C - n  y  QCPN^ ( jg C P N  y  C S ^ ~ ^ ,  y  and
>- ■ One can put the values into the corresponding formulas
given in Lemma 5 and verify the results.
The following example is to check if there exist more than one consumer 
whether relations above remains the same or not. It turns out that for this 
example relations stay the same.
Exam ple 2  For a = l ,6  = l , o : = l , n  = 2 , m = 2 , the following is true:
p C - N  y pCPN^ q C - N  y q CPN^ ^ g C P N  y C S ^ ~ ^ ,  0 ^^  ^ and
S W ^ ~ ^  >- ■ The same procedure applies.
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Case: a y O ,  n > 2 ,  m = l
For this case there are one firm producing with positive marginal cost and 
at least two consumers.
P rop osition  11  Let 7* be equal to
be equal to 7 7 ! ^  · Now the list /3*) forms a Nash Equilibrium.
Proof : The proof follows similar lines to the one for Proposition 5 . De­
fine P  as the price satisfying n(a -  bP ) =  m p * P  =  y ^ P  =
Now, open up the parentheses in the numerator of 7* and obtain ^  =
a(-2+4n-tofen+8a6n -^4a^^^+4a^6^n3  ^ SuppOSe that f  <  P. Then
¡,(l_4„+4a6n-8a6n^-l-4a^6^n2-4a262nJ) t't' b —
( —2 -I- 4n — dabn + Sabn3  — -I- 4o!^ 6^n )^ ^ (1 +  2abn)
( —1 -I- 4 n — 4 o;6n + 8ahn? —  Aa^h^n?· +  Aa^b'^rfi) ~ (2  + 2ab n)
After a little algebra, this leads to - 3  -I- 4 n — lOoftn -t- Sari^b —  Sa^ri^b“^ -I- 
An^a^b^ <  0 . Observe that when n > 2, left hand side is positive. Contradic­
tion. So ^  y  P . Now, without pencil work one can observe that for n > 1
0 X ^  ^ ^  S'"
that ^  y T  and 7* -< a. Now, return to the consumer i’s problem: Assume 
that the firm announces /3* and each of remaining consumers announces 7*. 
Consumer i’s problem is as given in (2 ): he will maximize his surplus by giv­
ing a >- 0 . Now, we claim that C S i{a ) y  C S i{ 'y )  V7 a. This is proved by 
a similar reasoning in Proposition 5 by using the results ^  y  P  and 7* a. 
Note that C S i{a ) y  0 since ^ y  ^  y  P . By definition of P  it must be true 
that P(o) P. Then f  y  P - So C S i{a )  y  0. Again define P  as the price 
satisfying (n -1 )7 *  + { n -  l ) b P  =  P *P . So P  = If consumer i gives
a 7 0 such that 7 -< P6, then he will consume zero amount so his surplus
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AD{P) =
AD{P) =
is zero. This is due to Pi')) = P  V7 -< Pb. Note that when consumer i 
announces such a 7, then aggregate demand will be
(n -  1)7* -  (n -  l)bP i i P > l  
7 +  (n — 1)7* — nbP if P < ^
and by defination of P  it follows that P{j) = P. So V7 ^ Pb CSi{a) =  0 . 
But since CSi{a) >- 0 , such 7s can not be the best response of consumer i. 
Clearly, ^  y  P - Now, V7 € [P6, 7 *]> aggregate demand will be
'  (n -  1)7* -  (n -  1)6P if P  > ^
7 +  (n — 1)7* — nbP if P  < ^
Consider the function G{P) =  7 +  (« ~  1)7 * ~  nbP VP 0 . Now, G{P) = 
AD{P) VP < .^ Suppose that ^ = P. By definition of P , P{'y) = P. 
Moreover, G{P) = AD{P) since I  = P. Since P(7) =  P, G{P{^)) = 
AD(P{j))·  Now, we will prove the following statement V  ^ G (P,  ^ ^
P(7). Let 1 E (P, t]· Suppose that 7 < P^j). Analyze the equality case. 
Then AD{P{j)) = (n -  1)7 * ~ {n -  l)bP{j). By definition of P{j),  (n -  
_  (n — 1)6P(7) =  P{j)·  Then P(7) =  P. Contradiction since ^ y  P. 
Left with the case  ^ P(7)-Then AD{P{j))  =  (n -  1)7* -  (n -  1)6P (7 )· 
By definition of P(7), (« -  1)7 * ~  (n -  l)bP{-y) = P*P{li)· But then P{'y) = 
P  Then  ^ ^ P i'y )  = £.■ Contradiction to the fact that  ^ comes form 
( £ , i ] ·  So V  ^ e { P , i ]  - It ^  P il) ·  Since VP <  ^ : G{P) = AD{P), 
y p  < I e  (P, ^ ] : G (P(7)) =  AD{P{'y)). Adding the previous result,VP <  
I  g  :t] : G (P(7)) =  AD{P{'y)). Now, let’s look at the case 7 € (7*, a].
For all such 7s
AD{P) =
j - b P  if i
7 +  (n — 1)7* — nbP if P  < ^
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Note that 7 < o and n > 2 . Suppose that P {'y )  >  ^ for some 7 G (7*, a]. 
Then A D {P {-y ) )  = 7 — b P { j ) .  By definition of P { j ) ,  7 — b P {'y ) =  P * P { j ) .  
Then P(7) = Since 7 < o and n > 2 , P(7) = ^  <¿4.^ . ·  ^ V // b+p- -  b+p' ^ ^TIT “
n
= P. We know that ^  y  P . But then ^  y  P  y  P(7). Then ^  y  ^
P  y  P (7).Contradiction to the supposition. Then V7 G (7*,a] :  ^ P(7)·
Thus, e { ^ , i ] : l y r b y p y  P(7). Since G(P) = A D { P )  P  <  ^ ,  
G { P { l ) )  = ■A D {P { 'y)) V7 G (7*, a]· Combining with the previous result, 
V7 G [P b io \ '· G {P { 'y ) )  = A D { P { j ) ) .  We also showed that if 7 -< Pb, then 
C S i{'y )  = 0 X C S i{a )  and if 7 o, C S i{a )  y  C S i{ j ) .  Thus, we can restrict 
the whole domain to [Pb, a]. Now, C S i{ 'j )  is a continuous function and [Pb, a] 
is a compact interval so C S i{ 'f )  arrives its maximum in this interval. Then 
the problem is
max C S i
7e[P6,a] ( 7 ) =  /Jo
7- 6P(7)
-  \^)dt -  i ’(7)(7 -  bP{j))
Since V7 G [Pb,o] '■ ^D{P{pf)) =  G{P{'y)) and by definition of P(7), 
AS{P{j)) = AD{P{j)) =  C(P(7)). Then 7 e [Pb,a] : P{^) =  ^ 5 ^ .  
Put the corresponding value for P(7) into objective function. F.O.C. for this 
problem, ^(1 — "  ^((l ~ nb+p· ) ~ nb+/3*)(^  ~ nb+p· ) {nb+p^)^ ~  ®
an--- b , I i>("-i)-r·
From which one obtains =  — ,1(1-~Z3  y *  I, , ·  After replacing 7*
and p*  with corresponding expressions, one can verify that Y  =  Y -  Now, 
S.O.D. of the objective function with respect to 7 is x ( l  -  and it
is negative V7 > 0. Thus, F.O.C. turns out to be necessary and sufficient. 
Thus, when each of other consumers announces 7* and the firm announce 
P* , announcing 7* is the best response of consumer i. Now, let’s turn to 
firm’s problem: Assume that each of the consumers announces the same 
7 0, that is ,there are symmetric set of strategies on the side of consumers.
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F irm ’s problem  is g iven  in (3 ). N ote  th a t th e ou tcom e price is solved  from  
(1) as P (/? ) =  using AD{P) = n{j -  bP) and AS{P) = /3P. So firm ’s 
problem
)HP -  a0 )^
F .O .C . for th is problem  ) ( {nb+py) * ^ / ^ ^ )  d- 2q;/?) — 0
A fter a little  algebra, /3 is solved  as proposed so p = =  P*. N ote  th a t
it is independent o f th e particular value o f  7  0 rather it d epends on their
syrnm etricity. N ow, S .O .D . o f th e profit function  w ith  respect to  P (after  
sim plify ing  in M athem atica) 27^n2(/?-26n+yn-a6^n^)  ^ denom inator
is positive, suppose th at the num erator is nonnegative. P u t P = P*. T h is  
leads to  1 >  (2  +  abn). C ontradiction . So S .O .D . is negative at P*. So p* 
satisfies S .O .C . N ote  th at ii P y  profit is negative w hereas ii P < ,^ then  
profit is non-negative. So we can restrict the dom ain  to  a com p act interval, 
[0 , - ] .  S ince profit function  is continuous function  o f P it arrives its  m axim um  
in th is interval. Since F .O .D . o f the objective  function  vanishes on ly  at P* 
and S .O .C . is satisfied  at p*, we conclude th at P* m axim izes it  over [0 ,o o ) .  
So P* is th e firm ’s b est response to  the consum ers each o f  w hom  announce  
the sam e value. T hus, it is the b est response o f firm to  the stra teg y  profile 
in w hich each consum er announces 7*, in particular. B y  add ing th e results  
from typ ica l consum er’s problem , we conclude th at ((7*)^=!, /3*) form s a  N ash  
equilibrium . QED
Proposition 1 2  Assume that consumers are organized. Let F* be equal to 
Qn(2+2an6) ¿g gquai to Now, the list (F * ,/3*) forms a unique
symmetric Nash equilibrium.
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Proof : Let ß* be chosen by th e firm. T hen  C U ’s problem  is to  m axim ize to ta l 
consum ers surplus as in (3 .4 ). N ote  th a t the ou tcom e price is solved  from  
(2 .1) as P ( r )  =  by using AD{P) = F -  bnP and AS{P) = ß*P. P u t  
the corresponding expression for P (P )  in th e objective  function . F .O .C . for 
th is problem  f ( l - 5 ^ ) - £ ( l - ; i ^ ) " - ^ ( l - ; j ^ )  = 0 . Prom which  
A fter p u ttin g  ß* =  one obta ins P^ =  =  P*.
S .O .D . o f the objective  function  ^ ( 1  -  ^ ^ ) ^  -  and it  is negative
for any r  0 . T hus, P* m aixm izes to ta l consum ers surplus w hen the firm  
announces ß* and so it is the b est respone o f CU. L et’s return to  the firm ’s 
problem . A ssum e th a t CU announces a P 0 . Now, th e firm ’s problem  is 
given in (3.5) and the outcom e price is ob ta ined  from (2 .1) as P{ß) -  
So firm ’s problem
P
m a x ll(^ )  =  (ß nb + ß n ß - o c ß ^ )
P .O .C . for th is  problem  2 ( ^ ^ ) ( ( ; ^ ^ ) ( / ?  -  a^^) -  (^ ¿ ^ )^ (1  -  ‘¿ocp) = 0 - 
Prom which (5 '^ =  \+2anS ~ if i® independent o f  a particular
value o f P 0 . S .O .D . o f the ob jective  function
-2P^n5 +  4a^P^n6 -  2P'^ 0!n^ 6^  -  P^2n5 +  2F^p 
{nb +  PY
Arrange th e term s in th e num erator and focus on it since we are sure th at  
d enom inator is p ositive. Suppose num er ator is n on -negative then  evaluate  
it a t P*. T h is leads to  0  1 +  anb -I- 2 a^ rPb‘^. C ontradiction . So S .O .D .
is negative at P*. N ote  th a t if  firm announces a p w hich is greater than  
-  then  its  profit w ill be negative. If it announces betw een  a p which is 
n on negative and less than then  its profit w ill bw nonnegative. So we 
can restrict the dom ain  into a com p act interval, w hich is [0 , ¿]. S ince profit
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function  is continuous function  o f  /3 , it arrives its  m axim um  in th is  interval. 
Since /3* is the on ly  p oin t sa tisfy in g  b oth  F .O .C . and S .O .C ., we conclude  
th a t it  m axim izes firm ’s profit over (0 , oo). T hus, firm ’s b est response to  any 
r  0  and in particular to  F*. C om bin ing th is result w ith  the one in C D ’s 
problem , we conclude th a t th e list (F * ,/3*) is a N ash equilibrium . A bou t  
uniqueness, /3* is the best response o f the firm to  any F X 0 and it  follows 
from  the problem  o f  C U  th a t F* is th e b est response o f  C U  to  (3*. T hus, th e  
list (F * ,/3*) is th e unique N ash equilibrium . QED
L e m m a  6  Consider the monopoly structure. Let q* be equal to ¿(f^abn) · 
Now, q* is the monopolist profit maximizing level of output.
Proof: T h e m onopolist w ith  a cost function , C{q) = aq^  w ill so lve (6 ). N ote  
th a t MR = ( |  — -^ q) and MC = 2aq. From F.O.C., M R = M C , q^  is ob tained  
as proposed. N ote th a t S .O .D . is negative for any n on -negative level o f  
production . So q* is the profit m axim izing  level o f ou tp u t. QED
P r o p o s i t io n  1 3  The following is true:
p M  ^ p C P N  ^ p C U P N
y q C P N  y q C U P N
C S C U P N  ^ y C S ^
llC P N  y Y^CUPN
y S W ^  y
Proof: F irstly, return to  th e gam e in which consum ers play N ash w ith  the  
firm. W e know th a t P^ '^^  = A fter p u ttin g  the corresponding exprès-
sions for 7 - and /?■, w e ob ta in
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Total quantity demanded (total quantity produced), = n ( Y —bP^^^).
Put the corresponding expressions for 7* and obtain
no(—1 + 2n — 2o:6n + 2abn^)C P N  _O —
b{—l +  4n — 4a 6n +  8abn^ — Aa^ b'^ 'n? +  Aa^b'^ n^)
Each con su m er w ill con su m e as m uch as (7* — bP^^^)  and u tilize  —
1(7* — bP^^^)  — ^{1* — bP ^^^Y  — p<^^^(7* — bP^^^),  w hich  is ca lcu la ted
/1 . ,1 r^oCPN _ a^(-l-4a6n+4n^-4a^ 6^ n^ +8a6n^ 4-4a^ 62n'*)
as (by u sin g  M ath em atica ) CS — 26(-1 +4n-4a6n+8o6n^-4a2b'^ n'^ +AaH'^ n^)'^  · 
R egard in g  the firm ’s profit, from  =  {P^^^f{P* -  aP^), =
T h en  to ta l so c ia l w elfare can be ca lcu ­
la ted  from  -I- by p u ttin g  correspond ing expres­
sion s for and  N ow , return to  th e gam e in  w hich  C U  plays
N ash  w ith  th e firm: W e know  th a t for V* = and p* - bn(3+4an6)  ^ l+ 2an6 ’
(r* ,/?*) is th e un ique N ash  equilibrium . N ow , th e  o u tco m e price is ca l­
cu la ted  from  as P^upn ^  T ota l q u an tity  de­
m an d ed  (to ta l q u a n tity  produced) a t th is  price =  P* -  bnP^^^^ =
(3+4a6n) consum er w ill con su m e since th ey  are sharing  to ta l
am ou n t equally. T h en  typ ica l co n su m er’s surplus =  f  (3+4at>n) “
W “ 2^ a(l+2abn) a _  3a^+4baa‘^ n /^nP r a n  vprifv that T C S  =
26M3+4a6n)^ 6(3+4a6n) (3+4a6n) “  26(3+4a6n)2 ’ verity tn a i i  UO
■ P rofit o f  th e  firm can  b e  ca lcu la ted  from  =  (P ^ ^ ^ ^ )2 (/?* —
aP"^ ) as =  ft(3"|^ 4Qfcnp · T o ta l so c ia l w elfare ca lcu la ted  from  =
as =  % 3 + ? X X  · m on op o ly
stru ctu re, we know  th a t to ta l q u a n tity  produced, = Q* = (^i+thn)· T h e
o u tco m e price ca lcu la ted  from  P ^  =  |  -  =  26(1+0®·
sum er w ill con su m e 2(i+L6n) in d u stry  dem and is n  tim es in d iv idu al
dem an d . T h en  CS^  =  ( |  -  lt)dt -  26(i+a6n) 2(i+a6n) ~  86(i+a6n)2 ·
N ow , m o n o p o lis t’s profit is ca lcu la ted  from  11^  =  P^Q^ -  a(Q^Y  as
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n "  =  U sin g  th em , SW" = nCS>  ^ +  m H "  =
N ow , we are ready to  m ake com parisons. S u pp ose th a t >  pCP^^
i.e .. i g S g  >  A f t -  a  l i t t le  a lgebra  th is
leads to  - 2  +  2n  -  Qahn +  &abri^  -  Aa^b'^ n  ^ +  < 0 . S in ce n  >  2 ,
left hand  side is p ositive. C ontrad iction . So P ^ p ^ y  pcuPN g^^p.
4-U f jdC P N  ^ p M  \ p a(-l+2n-2Qbn4-2Q6n^ )(l-f2abn) a(l+2afen)
pOS6 tnat 1 _  j · -j 6(-1 +4n—4a6n+8a6n2 — 4a^ 6^ -f4a^ 6^ )  — 26(l+a6n) * ’
T h is leads to  —1 — 2abn >  0 . C ontrad iction . So P ^  pCPN C om ­
b in ing  b o th  resu lts, P ^  pCPN ^  pcuPN A b o u t to ta l q u a n tities  pro­
duced , -< since 3 -t- 4 a 6n  y  2 + 2oibn. N ow , su p p ose th a t
q c p n  <  QM T h en  S  (3 + iiS )·  T h is  leads
to  - 2  -b 2 n  -  6 a 6n  -f  Qabn^  -  Aa^ b'^ n^  +  <  0 . S in ce n  >  2 , left
hand side is p ositive . C ontrad iction . So y  S u p p ose th a t
q C P N  >  q C U P N  X hen _ 1+4n - 4a(m+8a6ni^ - A a ^ ^ n ^ + A a ^ — 2(l+a6n)·
leads to  —1 -  2abn > 0 . C on trad iction . So y  . C om bin ing  b oth  
resu lts, >- >- ■ A b o u t in d iv id u a l con su m er’s surp lus, sup-
1 j. /^ oCPN  ^ ^ c C U P N  TVi^ kn (-l-4a6n+4n^ -4a^ 6^ Ti^ +8Q6n^ +4a^ 5^ n'*) ^
pOS6 thS-t Go — · ) (—l-f4n—4a6n+8o:6n^ —
___ 1__  ^ A fter a b it m assy  algebra, th is  leads to  0  >  4  -b 4 n^ -  8 n  -t-(3H-4a6n) '
2 4 abn + 4 0 ocbn^  — 64o:6n  ^+  20o!^6^n  ^-b 84a^6 n^·^  — '12a%^n^ -b 16o:^ 6^n^(2 — 
5n -b 3n^) +  16o;^ &^ n^  +  16o;‘*6 n^® -  32o!^ 6 n^® Since n > 2, right hand side 
is positive. Contradiction. So -< . Now, suppose that
< CS .T hen  1 >  ---------^ l+ 4nl\abn+Salmi-4a W + 4a W Y ----------- ·^
C all th is  in eq u ality  (*). S in ce n  >  2 , th e  d en om in ator and num erator are
p o sitiv e . D eh ne Exprl  as Exprl  = r^ iUn-tS^■^sмnf-L·н"J+^ a‘ '^‘’i‘)^  A"** 
Expr2  as Expr2 =  N o te  th a t  right hand
side o f  (*) equals to  Exprl  tim es Expr2 . Focus on Exprl.  O bserve th a t
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its denominator is positive and less than the numerator. So Exprl  is big­
ger than 1. Now, both denominator and numerator of Expr2 are positive 
and |n (—1 — 4abn)\ y  |—1 — 4 oibn\ and |—4o;^ 6^n |^ |—4o;^ 6^n |^ and other
terms of denominator and the numerator are the same. Then denominator 
is less than the numerator. So Expr2 is bigger than 1. So the right hand 
side of (*) is bigger than 1. Contradiction. So >- C S ^ . Combin­
ing both results, we have y  y  CS^. Regarding profits,
fjM ^ since ^ (2+2^17· Now, suppose that >
T h en  (3+4a'5„-p· ^  {-l+4n-4abn+8abn' ^ l e a d s  tO 
0 >  — 2 -f 2n  — 6abn -f 6abn  ^— 4a b^‘^n^  -f- C ontrad iction  sin ce right
hand side is p ositive . So 11^ ^ ^  ^  y]CUpn su pp ose th a t >  f l^ .
T h en  5  (m W  A fter » '> “ 1« algebra, th is
leads to  —1 — 2abn > 0 . C ontradiction . So 11^  C om bin in g  b oth
resu lts, we con clu d e th a t 11^  fjCFiv ^  j-j c f f v^ F in a lly  to ta l so c ia l wel- 
tares, su p p ose th a t S t r "  <  SW '^r'™ . T h en  ^  J s S i S F -  T h is
leads to  0 >  7  -h 2 n  -I- 2 6abn -I- 1 6 a^ b^ n^  + 2 8 a^ b‘^ n^ . C on trad iction . So 
SW^ y  ■ Now, su p p ose th a t SW^ > W e know  H ^ ,
j^CFN^ (JgCPN CS’^ . B y  su p p o sitio n , n{CS^^^ — CS'^) — ( n ^  -  
j^cFN^ <  Q D efine A =  ( - 1  +  4 n^ -  4 o!6n  -I- Socbn^  -  Aa^ b'^ n^  -|- Ao^ b'^ n'^ ) 
and 0  =  (-1  -I- 4 n  -  Aabn + 8abn  ^ -  Aa^ b'^ ri^  +  Aab'^ n^ y. C heck th at  
( - 1  + 2n -  2abn -f  2abn^y =  A -f r ,  w here r  =  2 -I- 8abn -  12abn? + 
8 a W  -  8 a W .  N ow, -  CS^) -  (R "  -  R ^ ^ ^ ) <  0  is can
be w ritten  as e^((| -  jfrfkF) -  -  « M i l ) ,  < o. T hen
A[S+2abn){l+abn)'^A+8T{l+abny- A{8 + 2abn)Q < 0 . M a th e m a tic a s im ­
plified le ft hand  side in to  - 1 5 + 2 4 n - 4 2 a 6n + 6 4 a 6n 2 - 3 6 (Q;6n )2 -f  5 6 (o:i))2n ^ +
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S{abn)^ +  1 6 {abnY w hich is p o sitiv e . C on trad iction . So SW^ -< 
C om b in in g  b o th , we have y  SW’^  >- So w e are done.
QED
Proposition 14
lim  7*
n—^ oo
lim  /?*
n->>oo
lim
n->oo
=  a
j _
2a
lim  = lim P^ = ^ y  lim  P^^^^ =  ^
0 n->oo ¿0n-^oo n—^ oo
.CPN  _lim  Q
n->oo
lim
n-^oo
lim
n—yoo
lim
n->oo
lim
n-^oo
lim
n->oo
lim  = lim Q  ^= : ^  y  lim  = £ -
- —  7i->oo 2ab n-^oo 4 aon->oo
lim  CS^ = lim  CS^ = lim = 0fi—y OO TL—^OO TL—^OO
SalP·
lim  =  lim  ^  lim
n -^ o o  n->oo n->oo L O C iO ^
lim  SW^ = lim  SW^ =
n -^ o o  n->oo 4Q'0^
3 a^
Î6Ö ^
Proof: F irstly , s in ce there is one firm , IM C fu n ction  b eco m es equal to  th e  
M C fu n ction  o f  th e  firm. B y  u sin g  D{P) =  n{a-bP)  and MC{q) =  2aq, we 
o b ta in  P^ =  t i t t m · 'Then is o b ta in ed  as Each in d iv id u a l
consum er w ill u tilize  / p c ( o  — bt)dt =  2b(î+4öÛ+^ö^b  ^ ^   ^ surplus. O ne  
can ea sily  verify th a t  lim  n-XX) =  I  and =  ¿ 5 -  B y  u sin g  th em
lim„_.oo =  l im „ _ o o ( i" ^ Q ^ -a (Q ^ )^ )  =  is straightforw ard  th a t
limn->oo =  0  and  limn..^oo =  0 . T h en  limn-+oo =  4 ^ ·  N o te
th a t B y  u sin g  correspon d in g  form ula from  P ro p o sitio n  13  for each econ om ic  
variable, one can  verify o th er lim its . QED
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An interesting observation from this proposition, the existence of an insti­
tution like CU leads to the suboptimality as the number of consumers goes 
to infinity. Although total consumer surplus is a positive finite amount in 
the limit, when it is distributed among very large number of consumers, 
individual consumer’s share goes to the nill. The loser here is the firm.
Case: o;>-0, n = l, m = l
In this case there is one consumer and one firm. The firm produces with 
positive cost.
P ro p o sitio n  15 Let 7 * be equal to and /3* be equal to
the list (7*,/3*) forms a unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Let (5* be chosen by the firm. Consumer’s problem is given in (3 .2 ). 
The outcome price is solved easily from (2 .1) as P (7 ) =  b ^ ·  F.O.C. for 
his problem f ( l  -  ^ )  -  ^(1 -  -  ^ ) .  From which,
~  (i+2afe) of (3* and verify that Y  = Y .  S.O.D. of
the objective function is ^ ( 1  -  ^ ) ^  -  -  ^ )  ^  0 for any 7  0 .
Note that consumer’s surplus function is continuous function of 7  and F.O.D. 
vanishes only at 7 *. Thus, 7 * maximizes his surplus over (0 ,0 0 ) and so it 
is the best response of consumer to P*. Let’s return to the firm’s problem. 
Let consumer announce any 7  X· 0. Firm’s problem is given in (3.3). Note 
that the outcome price is solved from (2 .1) as P{P) = F.O.C. for
this problem, 2 ^ ( ( j ^ ^ ) ( / 3  -  ap^) +  ( ^ ) ^ ( l  -  2ap) = 0 From which 
P  ^ is solved as Note that it is independent of the particular
value of 7 . Now, S.O.D. of the objective function after a bit manipulating is
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[-P + 2 b - 2o¡pb+ ab“^]. Concentrate on [-¡3+2b-2cipb+ab‘^]. Suppose 
that it is non-positive. Evaluate it at /?*. Then this leads to 1 >  2 -f- ab. 
Contradiction. So S.O.D. of the profit function is negative at /3*. So it 
satisfies S.O.C..One can verify the ior /3 y  ^ profit is negative otherwise it 
is non-negative. So we can restrict the domain to a compact interval [0, ^]. 
Since profit function is continuos function of /3 it arrives its maximum in 
this interval. Since f3* is the unique point satisfying F.O.C and S.O.C., we 
conclude that P* maximizes firm’s profit. So it is the best response of the 
firm to any 7  0 and so it is the dominant strategy to the firm. Since (3*
is the best response of firm to 7 *, in particular, we conclude that the list 
(YiP*) forms a Nash equilibrium. Uniqueness follows from the fact that ¡3* 
is the dominant strategy of the firm and 7 * is the best response of consumer 
to (3*. QED
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CHAPTER 4
STACKELBERG GAME
We can consider two games. In one of the games a firm is Stackelberg leader, 
whereas in the other consumers as organized are leaders. The latter reduces 
to Nash game because we observe that in all cases we cover so far, as long 
as there is symmetric bunch of strategies on the side of consumers, typical 
firm’s problem is independent from the particular values of intercept terms. 
Thus, we proceed with the game in which the firm is Stackelberg leader and 
consumers are either organized or unorganized followers. Data and strategy 
sets are as defined in the Model section and we search for symmetric equi­
libria. The firm is leader so it moves first and announces a number for its 
slope term, which induces a game for consumers. Given the firm’s strategy, 
consumers play Nash among themselves.
D efin itio n  3 Let 7 * 0 and P* > 0 and {j*)^_^and (/?*) be a symmetric
strategy profile of the consumers and the firm, respectively. We say the list 
((7 *)”_j, (P*)) forms a Stackelberg equilibrium if is the Nash equilib­
rium of the game induced by {P*) and (fi*)) a Nash equilibrium of
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the whole game.
Now, we proceed case by case and give equilibrium strategies.
Case: a = 0, n = l, m = l
In this case there is one consumer and one firm. The firm produces with zero 
cost.
P ro p o sitio n  16 Assume that the firm is Stackelberg leader. Let 7 * be equal 
to ^  and P* be equal to 2b. Now, the list (7 *,/?*) is the unique Stackelberg 
equilibrium.
Proof : Now, the firm is Stackelberg leader and the consumer is follower. 
Consumer’s problem for a given /3 >  0 to maximize his surplus by giving a 
7  0 as
f>7-6F(7)
max
7
n - » m )  a 1
C 5 (7 ) = y ^  ( - - - i ) d i - P ( 7 ) ( 7 - 6 P ( 7 ) )
where P (7 ) is the outcome price and solved from (1) as P{'y) =  F.O.C. 
for this problem = 0 From which Y  is solved as a
function of P, Y  — ‘(2b+^ ) · S.O.C is satisfied for any 7  0. Now,
the firm knows that consumer is rational and recognize how consumer will 
respond when it announces a. P >0. Then firm’s problem
m axn(^) =  P{p){pP{p))
where P{P) is the outcome price and solved from (2 .1) as P{P) =  Put
for Y .  Then firm’s problem.
a
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Then F.O.C. for this problem, (p+2b)^ (^  +  ~   ^ which is
solved as 26 =  /?*. S.O.D. for the profit function ~ 2^b+p)^  ^■ 
verify that it is negative. One can verify that Il(/?*) n(,d) V/? 46. So
we can restrict the domain into an compact interval since profit function is 
continuous function of /? it arrives its maximum in this interval.Since F.O.D. 
vanishes at (3* and S.O.C. is satisfied at /3*, it maximizes firm’s profit. Now, 
one can verify that for P*. Since consumer’s surplus function is con­
tinuous function of 7  and F.O.D. vanishes at 7 * for given P*. Since S.O.C. 
satisfied for any 7  0, 7 * maximizes consumer’s surplus for given P*. There­
fore, (7 *, P*) forms a Stackelberg equilibrium. Uniqueness is straightforward.
QED
Before giving our first theorem, any variable with superscript F SL  belongs 
to the game in which firm is Stackelberg leader consumer is follower.
T h eorem  1 The following is true:
p M ^ p C P N  y p F S L
= q C P N
- js f s l  ^ C S C P N  y C S ^
Y l F S L y ^ C P N
S W ^  = SW ^^^ y
Proof : Firstly, return to the Stackelberg game in which for 7* =  ^  and 
P* = 26, the list (7 *,/?*) forms a unique Nash equilibrium. Then =
Using this, = Y  -  bP^^^ = | .  Now, consumer’s surplus
=  I I  -  ¿(1)^  - M  = i -  Firm’s profit is n"*" =  (a )^26 =  g .
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Then total social welfare is ~  ~  Now, in the proof of
Proposition 8 , we gave the formulas regarding these variables for the game 
in which consumers play Nash with the firm and monopoly structure. By 
putting n =  1 there calculate pC'Piv _  qcpn  _  q ^ cpn _  jj^ cpn _
and ^  for the game in which consumer and firm play Nash
and = = h  C S ^  =  g ,  =  S  and S W ^  = Then, one
can easily verify the proposed relations. QED
Case: o; = 0, n > 2 ,  m = l
Only difference with the previous case is that there are more than one con­
sumers. We require consumers to form a union, otherwise things are getting 
really complicated. As a new notation F SL  -f CUF  is the abbreviation for 
“Firm Stackelberg leader and CU is follower” and any variable takes it as 
superscript belongs to this game.
P ro p o sitio n  17 Assume that consumers are organized and the firm is Stack­
elberg leader. Let F* he equal to ^  and fi* be equal to 2bn. Now, the list 
(F*,/3*) forms a unique Stackelberg equilibrium.
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Proposition 16. Firm is 
Stackelberg leader and CU is follower. The firm knows that CU is a rational 
player and for any ¡3 > 0 it will solve CU’s problem which is to maximize 
total consumer surplus by giving a F 0 as
max
r
T C S {r)=  [  
Jo
T-bnP{r) ,
{ - ^ - - t ) d t - P { r ) { r - b n P { r ) )
where P(F) is the outcome price and solved from (1) as P(F) =  Then 
F.O.C. for this problem =  0 FVom which P  is
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solved as a function of Note that S.O.C is satisfied for any
r  0. Now, the firm by recognizing how CU will respond when it announces 
a /? > 0 will solve its own problem, which is
maxn(/?) =  P i ^ P m
where F(/?) is the outcome price and solved from (1) as P{(5) — Then 
firm’s problem
F.O.C. for this problem, 2 -^ ^ -a n {2 b n  +  +  ( 26^ ) ^  =  0 From which
is solved as 2bn =  ¡3*. One can verify that S.O.C. is satisfied at /3* and 
n ( ^ )  Yl{p) y/3 >- 46n. So we can restrict the domain into a compact 
interval [0,46n]. Since profit function is continuous function of /?, it arrives 
its maximum in this interval and F.O.D. vanishes only at and S.O.C. is 
satisfied at /3*, it maximizes firm’s profit. Now, one can verify that F'’ =  F* 
for (3*. Since total consumer’s surplus function is continuous function of F 
and F.O.D. vanishes at F for given ¡3* and S.O.C. is satisfied for any F 0, 
F* maximizes consumer’s surplus for given /3*. Therefore, (F*,/3*) forms a 
Stackelberg equilibrium. Uniqueness is straightforward. QED
T h eorem  2 The following is true:
p M  ^ p C P N  y p C U P N  y  p F S L + C U F
q F S L + C U F  _ q C P N  y  q C U P N
^ g F S L + C U F  ^ C S C U P N  y C S C P N  y  C p M
nM ^ U C P N y Y ^ F S L + C U F  y  Y ^ C U P N
S W ^  = p ц r F S L + C U F  y
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Proof: Firstly, return to the Stackelberg game in which firm is Stackelberg 
leader and CU is follower. We know that for p* =  and /?* =  2bn. Now, the 
list (r*,^*) forms a unique Stackelberg equilibrium. First, equilibrium price 
from pf^SL+cuF _  pFSL+cuF _  ^  Total quantity produced equals to
total quantity demanded at equilibrium so q fsl+cuf — p» _  }j^pFSL+cuF _  
Since consumers equally divide this amount among themselves, each 
consumer will consume | .  Then individual consumer’s surplus =
— lt)d t — One can verify that
Now, firm’s profit =  (^pFsi+cuFy^* _  ^  Then total social
welfare +  y f^sl+cuf _  3| ^  Now, we know
from Proposition 8 (when n >  2) the following relations
p M  y  p C P N  ^  p C U P N
q M  ^  q c p n  ^  q C U P N
^  ^  ( j g M
Y[M ^  Y^CPN y  Y^CUPN
S W ^  y
and their magnitudes. Now, = -  ^ y  = p F S L + c u F  Then it
follows that y  P ^ ^ ^  y  P ^^P ^ y  P ^ sl+cuf since QP'Sl+cuf ^  
q m  _  ^  jt follows that q P's +^<^ uf _  q m  y qcpn  y qcupn Now, 
(jgFSL+cuF = ^  y ^  Then it follows that y
fjgcuPN y  y  C S ^ .  Suppose that U^sl+cuf >  Then
^  > r^rTT^ -^TW"· This leads to 16n^ -  24n +  7 <  0. Since n >  2, left hand 
side is positive. Then contradiction. So h fsl+cuf Nqw, since
y  y  ^  y  YII^SL+CUF y YICUPN  Clearly, . Then
it follows that ^ ^  u^SL+cuF y y^ upn  ^ gince =
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S W ^ ,  it follows that S W ^  =  sцrFSL+cuF ^  >~ . So we
are done. QED
Case: а)^0, n = l, m = l
For this case there is one consumer and one firm. The firm produces with 
positive marginal cost.
P ro p o sitio n  18 Assume that firm is Stackelberg leader. Let 7 * be equal to
‘'^ 4+sab^  й ^ ·  ( 7 * > ®  unique Stackelberg
equilibrium.
Proof: The consumer’s problem is as in the proof of proposition 16 and 
solved in the same way and Y  = is obtained from the F.O.C. of his
problem and S.O.D. is negative for any positive choice of 7  0. Now, firm’
s problem only differs with positive cost parameter. So
тахП (/?) =  P{P){pP{j3)) -  a{fiP{!5)f
where P(/?) is the outcome price and solved from (1) as P(/?) =  F.O.C. 
for this problem ~ = 0 · From which
we nbt4.in — в* Now S О П i" 4a (^l-2ag) . ba'^ (P-aP^ )we ooram p -  p . xnow, o.u .u . is ----- (2b+P)^  +  '~{2b~p)^ ~ ·
Mathematica simplified this into Suppose that the nu­
merator is non-negative and evaluate it at fi*. This leads to 1 >  2 -f 2ab. 
Contradiction. So S.O.D. is negative at fi*. So S.O.C. is satisfied at fi*. 
Note that we can restrict the domain into a compact interval, [0, since 
for all fis greater than ^ profit is negative and nonnegative otherwise. Since 
profit function is continuous it arrives its maximum in this interval. So fi* 
maximizes firm’s profit. Now, if we put fi* at Y ,  we obtain 7 *. By the same
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reasoning in the proof of Proposition 1 6 , we conclude that the list is the 
unique Stackelberg equilibrium. Q E D
T heorem  3  The fo llo w in g  is  tru e :
p M ^ p C P N  y p F S L
Q ^ ^ ^ y
q C P N
. g F S L  ^ C s c P N  ^ C S ^
)- Y lF S L  y H C P N
s w ^  y y
P ro o f: Firstly, return to the Stackelberg Game. We know that for 7* = 
o(3+4a6) Q* _ 2b jg unique Stackelberg equilibrium. From
pF S L  ^ the outcome price solved as Total quantity
i F S L =  Y ^bpF SL  ^
(2 + 406) *produced equals to total quantity demanded so Q
(X
So the consumer consumes ¡ 5 4 ^  and his surplus =  /o'” “ *’ (f  -
=  ipikti· And arm’s proat -
a {P * P ^ '^ ^ Y  = 86(i+2a&)· them total social welfare +
ttfsl _ . 3a^  Now, the outcome of Nash game is calculated as follows:
We know from Proposition 14  that for 7* = and (3* =  (i+2aT)>
list (7*,/?*) forms a unique Nash equilibrium. Then the outcome price is 
pC P N  ^ ^  = S S S } ·  consumer consumes Y ~ b P ^ ^ ^  =
_ 2 _ This is also total quantity produced, at equilibrium price. The
(3+4q6) '
consumer’s surplus is =  j^ (3+ «(.) 6(3+4a6) (3+4ab) 26(3+4ab) ’
And firm’s profit is =  pCPN(^*pCPN) _
Then total social welfare Now, the
monopoly structure is left. From Lemma 6 by putting n = 1 obtain =
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2(1+a6) is the monopolist’s profit maximizing level of output. Put it into
inverse industry demand (individual consumer’s demand here) and obtain 
pM  =  I — The consumer’s surplus is C S ^  -  i f  ~
2(1+^ ·  monopolist’s profit -
. Finally, total social welfare is calculated from S W ^  =4b(l+ab)a{/3*P^r =
C S ^  +  =  8ft(i+a6°^^^'· Now, we have all the necessary information to make
the comparisons. Start with the prices. Suppose that < P^^^. Then
(i+2a^ ^ (1+^ Qfr) This leads to 1 >  0. Contradiction. So p ^ ^ ^  y  P^^^.
(3+4a6) — (4+8a6) —
Clearly, ^ F ^ . So ^ P ^ ^ ^  y  P^^^  Since 2+2ab ^  2 + 4 a b 3+
4ab, it follows that y  y  The relation C S^^^ y  y
C S ^  is straightforward. Regarding the profits suppose that 
Then (3^4q^ )7 > 8(i+2Qfe)· leads to 0 >  1. Contradiction. So 11^^^
Clearly, ^  Then y  y  Finally, total
social welfares: Suppose that Then
This leads to 0 >  7 +  Sab. Contradiction. So -< Suppose
that > S W ^ .  Then This leads to 0 >  2ab+ {ab)\
Contradiction. So S W ’^  y  Then S W ^  y  SW ^^^ y  So
we are done. QED
Case: a>^0, n > 2 ,  m = l
In this case there are more than two consumers and one firm again. The firm 
produces with positive marginal cost.
P ro p o sitio n  19 Assume that consumers are organized. Let F* be equal to 
T i+ s S y  1+^abn· (r*,/?*) forms a unique
Stackelberg equilibrium.
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Proof: The CU’s problem is as in the proof of Proposition 17 and it is solved 
in the same way. So one obtains Now, the firm’s problem
only differs with positive cost parameter. So its problem
m axn(^) =  P{ß)ißP{ß)) -  oc{ßP{ß)f
where P{ß) is the outcome price and solved from (1) as P{ß) = 
F.O.C. for this problem (ß l ^ ) ( (ß^2bü) )^ (^ ~  (;9+26n) (^  ^ “  “
0 From which one obtains =  t ä h S f =  ß*·
S O.C. satisfied at ß*. Again it is possible to restrict the domain into a 
compact interval [0, ¿]. When one puts ß* in F^ one obtains F*. By the 
same reasoning in Proposition 18, we conclude that the list (F*,^*) forms a 
unique Stackelberg equilibrium. QED
Note that FSL+ C U F  is the abbreviation of the statement “Firm Stackelberg 
Leader and CU is follower” . As a new notation, any variable with superscript 
F SL  + CUF  reveals that it belongs to that game.
T h eorem  4 The following is true:
p M  p C P N  y  p C P N  y  pFSL
. / « ( .£  QCPXyQCVF,
. /  ab e  ( % i ,  oo) : Q "  ^  X q fu i+cuf y  qcupn
QgFSL+CUF y  y  C S ^ ^ ^ y C S ^
rfM ^ Y^FSL^CUF y  Y^ CUPN
5 pyCPiV ^ ^ g^^FSL+CUF y  5 ^Ct/PV
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Proof : Firstly, return to the Stackelberg game. We proved in Proposition 18 
that for r* =  (r*,/?*) forms the unique Stackel­
berg equilibrium. The outcome price is calculated from p^^^+o'i/F _
p F S L + c u F  _  a(i+4q^ Total quantity produced equals to total quantity 
demanded so = T* -  ftP^^L+ct/F ^  since the contract
among the consumers is the equal division of total quantity produced at equi­
librium, each consumer will consume 2+4a&n · Then each consumer will obtain 
the surplus CS'^SL+cvF ^  -  lt)d t -
One can verify that so the contract among
the consumers equally divides the total consumers surplus. Now, firm’s profit 
n F sr+ct/f ^  (p F sr+ o!'f)2(;3· _a(/3-)2)) =  -¡55^ = ^  Then total social wel­
fare = is jp sE ^  Ftom Proposition
13 we know the following relation
p M y p C P N p C U P N
y Q C P N y
q C U P N
C S C U P N  ^ C S C P N  ^ C S ^
>- n C F iV ^ Y^CUPN
y S W ^  y
and their magnitudes. So, we have all the necessary information to carry out 
the comparisons. Start with the prices. Suppose that P^^l+cc/f >  pcuPN 
Then l l± i4 4  > This leads to 0 > 1. Contradiction. So y
pFSL+cuF Combining with the above relation, P ^  >- P ^ ^ ^  y  pc^^^  
F"*'·. Since 3-t-4aim 2-I-4q , ^  Suppose that Q«'’« <
¥-»r i r  1 r 171 r n i  ( l “f‘2Ti *2 o ib T L ~ \~ ^ O ib T i____________ __________ ^  ________1________  IPiiiCis to
Q . Thon -Aa'^ b^ n^'^  +^ a^ b'^ Ti^ ) — (2+Aabn)
n iiabn -iab -A a^y^ri^  + ia^b^ri^) < 1. This implies +  l >  n > 2.
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So ii Aabn{l+abn) + l, is less than or equal to 1, then it is consistent with the 
supposition otherwise it contradicts the supposition. So focus on the equation 
Aabn + 4a^b‘^ri  ^- 1  =  0. Set x =  ab and find the roots of +  4a;n - 1  =  0. 
It turns out that xi = and X2 =  are the roots. Since x =  a b y 0 ,
we use X2- Now, Wab e  (0, ~^ 2^ ) ■ Ax'^n^+  4 x n - l  -< 0 and this is consistent 
with the negativity side of the supposition, q f s l +c u f  ;^ = aft =
then 4a;^n  ^ +  4a:n - 1  =  0 and this is consistent with the equality
2n ’
side of the supposition, Finally, Vai. € ( = ^ . o o )  :
4a;^n  ^+  Axn -  1 0 and and this contradicts the supposition so for this case
its negation is true. Thus, Vaft € ^ q f s l +cuf clearly,
q m  y  q f s l +cuf Combining all.
if ab e  (o, : Q ^ y q F S L + C U F  y q C P N  y  q C U P N
i f « 6 G ( ^ , o o ) : Q ^ y Q C P N y q F S L + C U F  y  q C U P N
ita h  =  ^ : Q ^ y QCPN =
q F S L + C U F  y  q C U P N
Now, we come to the consumer’s surplus. Clearly, >-
so combining with the relation above >- >- >-
C S ^ . Regarding total social welfares: Suppose that S W ^  <
(3+2a&^  ^ T -r. This leads to ‘labn  +  ab '^n? <  0. Contradic-i l i e i l  (i+a(,n)2 _  (i+2a6n)
tion. So SVF" Suppose that
Then This leads to 7 +  Sabn < 0. Contradiction,
So y  · Combining both results with the above re-
lations, we conclude that y  S W ^  y  y
Now, let’s return to the profits. Suppose that 11^^^^ >  Then
,_Lhrr· This leads to 0 >  1. Contradiction. So >-
(3+4a6n)··  ^ — 8(H-2a6n)
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Y^cuPN j^now that and )-
This implies y f^sl+cuf Adding the relations above, we conclude that
>- >- jjCi/FN 3q g^ pg done QED
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CHAPTER 5
EXTENSION
R em ark 1 Consider the case in which there are one consumer and one firm. 
The firm produces with zero cost. Now, let’s extend the consumer’s strategy 
set so that the consumer can also announce a slope parameter. So the firm 
announces a /3 € E+ U {oo} for the slope parameter of its linear supply 
function and the consumer announces a 7  G R++ U {0 0 } for the intercept 
term and a  ^ G M++ U {0 0 } for the slope parameter of its affine demand 
function. Assume that a (7 , is already announced by the consumer. Let’s 
analyze the firm’s problem, which is
maxn(/3) =  P{ß){ßP{ß))
by giving a non-negative number. Note that P{ß) is the outcome price 
and solved from (2 .1) by using AD{P) =  7  — ^P  and AS{P) = ßP  as 
F.O.C. for this problem -t- =  0. Prom which
one obtains ß* = Now, S.O.D. of the objective function One
can verify that at ß* S.O.D is negative. Moreover, one can also check that 
n(/3*) >- n(/3) V/3 >- 2  ^and so we can restrict the domain to [0,2 ]^ which is
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compact and profit function is continuous on non-negative numbers. Thus, 
profit function arrives its maximum in this interval. Note that P* is the only 
point satisfying F.O.C and S.O.C.. So profit function has the maximum at 
P*. Therefore, the firm’s best response to any positive (7 , 0  is P* = Let’s 
analyze the consumer’s problem through Figure 5.1 above. Note that since 
P* 0 and MC{q) =  0, then the firm does not announce its MC function 
as a best response. Remember that D{P) = a — bP is the consumer’s true 
demand function. Since MC{q) = 0, consumer surplus is maximized when 
P  =  0. Also note that when P  =  0, total social welfare is maximized. For 
P*’ =  0 and q^  =  a, {P'^,q^) is the competitive equilibrium outcome. The
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consumer’s problem is solved algebraicly as follows:
CS(7,i)= f
Jo
7-iP(7,i) a 1
-  P (t , i ) 7  -  ^^(7 , 0
F.O.Ds.
dCS a 1 7
d-y 4 6 ^ ” 2e
dCS 7
4^2
Note that any finite number for consumer’s slope parameter do not maximize 
his surplus since >- 0 and it becomes zero only on the limit as  ^ —>^ 0 0 .
Ja 
1+
From ^ =  0, 7 *’ =  T ^ . So as  ^ ^  0 0 , Y 2a. One can also check that 
as  ^ 0 0 , S.O.D. of the objective with respect to 7  goes to zero. Now, we
return to the graphical analysis: If consumer tells the true parameters, firm 
will respond by b. This will lead to the price P(a, b). However, consumer can 
do better by announcing (7 S^^) so that he can obtain the price P (7 ^^^). 
To follow this, let him announce a sufficiently large so that ^  -< P(a, b) 
as he keeps the intercept parameter in a. Demand function will rotate as 
in the figure and supply function will shift downward. How much will be 
that shift? Imagine a rectangle whose three vertices are origin, o, Now, 
from the remaining vertice supply function should pass. This will guarantee 
that supply function’s new slope equals to Now, let consumer fix and 
increase intercept term to obtain the price, we call P (7 S^^), at which true 
demand function and the new supply function intersect. Then his demand 
curve, 7  — bP, will move on ^^P from a — to 7  ^— ^^P. Clearly, by giving 
(7 ^ consumer is better off compared to by giving (o, b) since he consumes 
more at a lower price. Both outcomes are on the true demand function so 
we can compare them directly. Now, consumer still can do better. He can
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give a sufficiently large so that ^  ^  Take the demand a —
as reference. Firm responds to this slope change by announcing so supply 
function will shift downward. It will pass from the remaining vertice of the 
rectangle whose vertices are origin , a, and To determine 7 ,^ fix and 
increase the intercept term of a — That  is move 7  —^^P on from a —
^^P  to obtain the price at which and true demand function intersect. We 
call this price P (7 ^,^^) which is less than P{'y^,^^) and consumer consumes 
more in the former. So consumer is better off. Note that a -< 7  ^ ^  7  ^
and 6 Consumer can still do better he can announce sufficiently
large such that ^  ^ P (7 ^,^^). Then supply function will shift downward 
appropriately. Again consumer by moving a — ^^P  on ^^P by increasing 
the intercept term to 7 ,^ he can obtain P (7 ,^^®) and 7  ^ — ^^P(7 ,^^®) =  
a — bP{j^,^^). Clearly, P (7 ^,^^) -< P (7 ^,^^) and so a — i>P(7 ^,^^) y  a — 
6P (7 ^,^^). So this is better for consumer. Importing thing is that 7 ® ^ 7  ^
and >- The process is clear. The consumer will have sequences in 
his mind as (a ,7 ^ 7 ^,7 ®, .·.) and (6, such that lim¿^oor =  cxd,
lim¿-+oo7‘ =  2a and so limj_ o^o P ( 7 \  D  =  0 and limj^oo(7* -  ^-^(7 *)^)) =  
lim¿_>oo(o — bP{Y, =  0,. So in the limit competitive outcome is obtained. 
Thus, the consumer would target the socially optimizing outcome. In other 
words, interest of consumer and society coincide here. Similarly, CU, if there 
were more than one consumers and they formed union, would target the 
socially optimizing outcome since it is as if one consumer and plays with 
aggregate demand on behalf of consumers. Therefore, if there are one firm 
producing with zero cost, whose strategy slope parameter of its linear supply 
function and CU representing consumers, whose strategies intercept term
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and slope parameter of the aggregate demand and if they play Nash, the 
socially optimizing outcome is the limit outcome.
R em ark  2  Consider the case in which there are one consumer and one firm. 
The firm has a cost function C{q) = aq^. Implying that it has a MC{q) =  2a. 
Assume that for this case strategy set of the consumer is extended so that the 
consumer can also announce a slope parameter. Thus, the firm announces 
a ^ € E+ U {0 0 } for the slope parameter of its linear supply function and 
the consumer announces a 7  e  R++ U { 0 0 } for the intercept term and a 
 ^ G R++U{oo} for the slope parameter of its affine demand function. Assume 
that a (7 ,^) is chosen by the consumer. Now, the firm’s problem is
m axn(^) =  P iW P iP ) )  -  a { m P ) ?
by giving a non-negative number. Note that the outcome price, P{(3) =  ^  
by using AD{P) =  7  — and AS{P) = PP  from market clearing. F.O.C. 
for this problem — aP'^) + — 2aP) = 0 From which
P* =  r+ |s | — x:j^  ^  verify that S.O.D is negative at P*.
Note that profit of the firm is negative if P is greater than ^ and so we can 
restrict the domain into a compact interval, [0, ¿]. Since the firm’s profit 
function is continuous, it arrives its maximum in this interval. One can ver­
ify that S.O.D is negative at /?* and it is the only point satisfying F.O.C. 
as well. We conclude that P* maximizes the firm’s profit. Now, let’s try 
to solve the consumer’s problem algebraicly. It is the same with the one 
in Remark 1 but now, the firm announces p* =  yqzlai· F.O.C. of
his problem 7 * =  1 -^---- . Note that lim^_yoo7 * =  co. For
_)
critical value of  ^ Mathematica supplies one page long expression, which 
is useless. So we proceed with the graphical analysis. Observe that P* is
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a function of slope parameter of consumer,  ^ and Thus,
as the value of consumer’s slope parameter gets larger and larger, i.e., as 
demand function becomes perfectly elastic, the firm becomes marginal cost 
pricer. In other words, consumer has the power to make the firm marginal 
cost pricer at least arbitrarily close to that. Consider the following out­
come. Let be such that AD(P^) = IMC{P^) and AD{P^) = g®,
where IMC{q) is the industry marginal cost function. Note that since there 
is one firm here, IMC{q) =  MC{q). One can prove that (P^,q^) is the 
socially optimum outcome. That is, at this outcome total social welfare, 
sum of total consumers’ surplus and total profits, is m a x im ized .U sin g  
AD{MC{q^)) = a -  b2aq^ = q \  and P* =  MC{q^) =
We depict this outcome in the Figure 5.2 in the next page. Now, our con­
cern whether the consumer would target this point or not. We know that 
as consumer makes his demand function perfectly elastic, the firm becomes 
marginal cost pricer. Suppose that the firm marginal cost pricer, that is, it 
submits /? =  ¿ -  Now, formulate the consumer’s problem as picking a positive 
number for its intercept term to maximize his surplus. Consumer’s problem 
is the same with the one in proof of Proposition 14. From there we know 
that when firm submits a non-negative /?, from the F.O.C. of the consumer’s 
problem Y  =  So for ^  =  T_, 7 =^ =  . Since S.O.D is negative for
any positive choice of intercept term, consumer’s surplus function is concave 
so F.O.C. turns out to be necessary and sufficient. So when firm announces 
/3 =  announcing 7  =  maximizes consumer’s surplus. Note that
7  ^  a. Thus, as the consumer forces firm to become marginal cost pricer by
According to the definition in Grossman, “Nash”., competitive equilibrium does not 
exist for this case since MC{q) >- AC{q) > 0
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Figure 5.2:
making his demand infinitely elastic, he would not target {P^,q^) at which 
true demand function and firm’s marginal cost intersects but rather it would 
target the point at which j  — bP and marginal cost of the firm intersects. We 
depict this outcome in Figure 5.2 as (P^, qa). Since at the latter outcome con­
sumer’s surplus is maximized when firm announces its marginal cost which is 
almost the case when consumer makes its demand function almost perfectly 
elastic. Therefore, consumer would not target socially optimum outcome. 
That is, the interest of consumer and society does not coincide here. Simi­
larly, CU on behalf consumers would not target the socially optimal outcome 
since it is as if one consumer and plays with the aggregate demand function. 
Therefore, we do not expect the socially optimum outcome when CU whose
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strategies are intercept and slope parameter of the aggregate demand func­
tion and one firm whose strategy is the slope parameter of its linear supply 
function play Nash.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
We have considered consumers as players along with firms in oligopolistic 
markets by defining games in which identical firms with quadratic cost func­
tions restricted to announce linear supply functions and identical consumers 
with affine true demand functions are allowed to manipulate their intercept 
terms either in organized or unorganized manner. We have established the 
symmetric equilibria of both the Nash game and the Stackelberg game. In 
the latter a firm is assumed to be leader. When the consumers as orga­
nized are Stackelberg leaders, the game reduces to the Nash game. This is 
due to the assumption that consumers can only manipulate their intercept 
terms. When consumers’ strategy sets are extended to include their slope 
parameters, this will not be the case. We know from our remarks, firm’s best 
response is a function of consumers’ slope terms so when they are manipu­
lated firm’s strategy will change accordingly. When consumers are followers 
they are assumed to be organized. The case in which they are unorganized 
followers leads to the complications so we do not study here. For the Nash 
game, when there are at least two firms producing with positive marginal
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cost, we only make comparisons for particular set of values of parameters 
since outcome expressions are cumbersome. We support this peace of in­
formation with the limit results. Nevertheless, we cover fairly large class of 
cases to get an extensive idea on the possible effects of considering consumers 
as players along with firms and our findings are as follows:
Only for the case in which there are at least two firms producing with zero 
cost, telling the truth is the best response of each consumer to the others’ 
strategy profile in which each of remaining consumers tells the truth and 
each firm announces its M C  function. This Nash equilibrium is the unique 
symmetric one as we prove in Proposition 2. Moreover, the outcome of this 
equilibrium leads to the social optimum. In all remaining cases that we 
cover, consumers misrepresent their intercept terms downwards as their best 
responses so declared demand function lies to the left of their true demand 
function at each price and firms announce a slope parameter which is less 
than the value in the supply function obtained from M C  function as their 
best responses so declared supply function lies above of their M C  functions 
at each quantity. We show that if either the number of consumers or firms 
gets larger and larger (whenever the case allows), they tell the truth in the 
limit.
One finding regarding the case of natural monopolist is that whenever 
forming union is meaningful, that is there are at least two consumers, it is 
strength for consumers so they increase their utility. Furthermore, if they 
form union in the Stackelberg game, they are better off compared to the Nash 
Game in which they form union. When there is one consumer, he or she is 
better off in Stackelberg game and the firm loses less compared to the Nash
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game. So Stackelberg equilibrium is an improvement for both parties in this 
case. When number of consumers more than one, this is not true anymore. 
Though consumers obtain the most compared to the other structures, the 
firm loses more compared to the Nash game in which consumers and the firm 
are players in this case. Thus, Stackelberg game outcome is an improvement 
for the consumers over the Nash game outcome.
The case of one firm is interesting for another reason. Since there is not 
any other firm providing the competitive behavior, franchise bidding proce­
dure for monopoly due to Loeb and Magat is inapplicable. Only remaining 
option is to tax the monopolist. This policy might have deficiency since the 
cost parameter of the firm is private to itself. However, our results show 
that allowing consumers to manipulate their demand functions is equivalent 
to taxing the monopolist. Under these alternative institutional assumptions 
consumers are better off and the firm is loser while the society gains or lose 
depending on the case. For example, for the case in which there are at least 
two consumers and one firm producing with positive cost there is welfare 
gain in the game all agents are players compared to the monopoly structure. 
Then total gain of consumers must be higher than the loss of the firm. This 
means consumers may even compensate the firm’s loss and can be still better 
off than the initial monopoly structure while firm is made indifferent between 
two structures. However, there is much to gain for consumers in this case. It 
is shown in Theorem 4 consumers obtain the most benefit under the Stack­
elberg game when CU is the follower. Thus, the designer can bargain to get 
the amount of tax that is equal to increase in total consumers’ surplus when 
agents switch from monopoly structure to Stackelberg game. The firm does 
^*Loeb and Magat, “Regulation”.
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not lose the most profit in this game rather it is in the worst situation when 
it plays Nash with CU. Prom the relation about social welfare outcomes of 
both games we observe that the total loss of the firm is less than the total 
gain of consumers so there is profit arising from the design of the market. To 
sum up there are alternative structures and all of them transfer income from 
the monopolist to the consumers, which provides the designer of the market 
a bargaining power against the monopolist. When the firm produces with 
zero or positive cost and there is one consumer or when the firm produces 
with zero cost and there are at least two consumers, the same reasoning is 
valid.
In all cases, the distribution of total social welfare leads to the result 
that consumers become better off and so firms are losers compared to the 
Cournot-Nash game. Regarding the society’s gain, we find that when there 
are at least two firms producing with zero cost, the Nash equilibrium in in­
tercept terms of demand functions and slope parameters of supply functions 
yields the socially optimum outcome. For the positive marginal cost how­
ever, total social welfare outcome of the game where consumers and firms 
play Nash turns out to be even less than the total social welfare obtained 
from the Cournot-Nash game. We note that as the number of consumers goes 
to infinity, the outcomes of Cournot-Nash game and the Nash game we define 
coincide in the limit. Although for the case in which there is one firm produc­
ing with positive cost, there is some gain in total social welfare compared to 
the Cournot-Nash game, since when they are finite in numbers equilibrium 
do not occur on true demand function and IM C  function, socially optimizing 
outcome is not obtained. Restricting the consumer to manipulate only his
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intercept term seems to be the reason. However, we observe in the Remark 
2 , although consumers are allowed to manipulate their slope parameters as 
well, CU does not target the socially optimal outcome. What would happen 
if consumers were not organized in the same situation? This is an interesting 
case to study but it is tough to solve. We note that in the case of one firm 
producing with zero cost and finite number of consumers represented by CU 
which is allowed to manipulate both intercept and slope parameters, then 
social optimal outcome is obtained in the limit of strategies.
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